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Ideas from 'Three Grades of Modal Involvement' by Willard Quine [1953], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Ways of Paradox and other essays' by Quine,Willard [Harvard 1976,0-674-94837-8]].

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5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
12219 Whether a modal claim is true depends on how the object is described
                        Full Idea: Quine says if ∃x□(x>7) makes sense, then for which object x is the condition rendered true? Specify it as '9' and it is apparently rendered true, specify it as 'the number of planets' and it is apparently rendered false.
                        From: report of Willard Quine (Three Grades of Modal Involvement [1953]) by Kit Fine - Quine on Quantifying In p.105
                        A reaction: This is normally characterised as Quine saying that only de dicto involvement is possible, and not de re involvement. Or that that all essences are nominal, and cannot be real.
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
10922 Objects are the values of variables, so a referentially opaque context cannot be quantified into
                        Full Idea: The objects of a theory are not properly describable as the things named by the singular terms; they are the values, rather, of the variables of quantification. ..So a referentially opaque context is one that cannot properly be quantified into.
                        From: Willard Quine (Three Grades of Modal Involvement [1953], p.174)
                        A reaction: The point being that you cannot accurately pick out the objects in the domain
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
10923 Aristotelian essentialism says a thing has some necessary and some non-necessary properties
                        Full Idea: What Aristotelian essentialism says is that you can have open sentences Fx and Gx, such that ∃x(nec Fx.Gx.Źnec Gx). For example, ∃x(nec(x>5). there are just x planets. Źnec(there are just x planets)).
                        From: Willard Quine (Three Grades of Modal Involvement [1953], p.176)
                        A reaction: This is a denial of 'maximal essentialism', that all of a things properties might be essential. Quine is thus denying necessity, except under a description. He may be equivocating over the reference of 'there are just 9 planets'.
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
10921 Necessity can attach to statement-names, to statements, and to open sentences
                        Full Idea: Three degrees necessity in logic or semantics: first and least is attaching a semantical predicate to the names of statements (as Nec '9>5'); second and more drastic attaches to statements themselves; third and gravest attaches to open sentences.
                        From: Willard Quine (Three Grades of Modal Involvement [1953], p.158)
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
10924 Necessity is in the way in which we say things, and not things themselves
                        Full Idea: Necessity resides in the way in which we say things, and not in the things we talk about.
                        From: Willard Quine (Three Grades of Modal Involvement [1953], p.176)
                        A reaction: This is a culminating idea of Quine's thoroughgoing empiricism, as filtered through logical positivism. I would hardly dare to accuse Quine of a use/mention confusion (his own bęte noir), but one seems to me to be lurking here.