Ideas from 'Events as property exemplifications' by Jaegwon Kim [1976], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Supervenience and Mind' by Kim,Jaegwon [CUP 1993,0-521-43996-5]].

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7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / c. Reduction of events
How fine-grained Kim's events are depends on how finely properties are individuated
                        Full Idea: How fine-grained Kim's events are depends on how finely properties are individuated.
                        From: report of Jaegwon Kim (Events as property exemplifications [1976]) by Jonathan Schaffer - The Metaphysics of Causation 1.2
                        A reaction: I don't actually buy the idea that an event could just be an 'exemplification'. Change seems to be required, and processes, or something like them, must be mentioned. Degrees of fine-graining sound good, though, for processes too.
Events are composed of an object with an attribute at a time
                        Full Idea: Kim's events are exemplifications by an object of an attribute at a time...It does not make events basic entities, as the three constituents are more basic, but it gives identity conditions (two events are the same if object, attribute and time the same).
                        From: report of Jaegwon Kim (Events as property exemplifications [1976]) by Peter Simons - Events 2.1
                        A reaction: [Aristotle is said to be behind this] I am more sympathetic to this view than the claim that events are primitive. If a pebble is ellipsoid for a million years, is that an event? I think the concept of a 'process' is the most fruitful one to investigate.
Events cannot be merely ordered triples, but must specify the link between the elements
                        Full Idea: Kim's events cannot just be the ordered triple of , since many such triples do not yield events, such as . Kim has to specify that the object actually has that property at that time.
                        From: report of Jaegwon Kim (Events as property exemplifications [1976]) by Peter Simons - Events 2.1
                        A reaction: Why should they even be in that particular order? This requirement rather messes up Kim's plan for a very streamlined, Ockhamised ontology. Circles have symmetry at all times. Is 'near Trafalgar Square' a property?
If events are ordered triples of items, such things seem to be sets, and hence abstract
                        Full Idea: If Kim's events are just the ordered triple of is that such things are standardly conceived as abstract entities, usually sets, whereas events are concretely located in space and time.
                        From: comment on Jaegwon Kim (Events as property exemplifications [1976]) by Peter Simons - Events 2.1
                        A reaction: You might reply that the object, and maybe the attribute, are concrete, and the time is natural, but the combination really is an abstraction, even though it is located (like the equator). Where is the set of my books located?
Since properties like self-identity and being 2+2=4 are timeless, Kim must restrict his properties
                        Full Idea: Since some tautologously universal properties such as self-identity or being such that 2+2=4 apply to all things at all times, that is stretching Kim's events too far. Candidate properties need to be realistically restricted, and it is unclear how.
                        From: comment on Jaegwon Kim (Events as property exemplifications [1976]) by Peter Simons - Events 2.1
                        A reaction: You could deploy Schoemaker's concept of natural properties in terms of the source of causal powers, but the problem would be that you were probably hoping to then use Kim's events to define causation. Answer: treat causation as the primitive.
Kim's theory results in too many events
                        Full Idea: The criticism most frequently levelled against Kim's theory is that it results in an unacceptable plurality of finely differentiated events, because of the requirement for identity of the constituent property.
                        From: comment on Jaegwon Kim (Events as property exemplifications [1976]) by Peter Simons - Events 4.4
                        A reaction: This may mean that the Battle of Waterloo was several trillion events, which seems daft to the historian, but it doesn't to the physicist. A cannon firing is indeed an accumulation of lots of little events.