green numbers give full details | back to texts | unexpand these ideas
| 8793 | If observation is knowledge, it is not just an experience; it is a justification in the space of reasons |
| Full Idea: In characterizing an observational episode or state as 'knowing', we are not giving an empirical description of it; we are placing it in the logical space of reasons, of justifying and being able to justify what one says. | |||
| From: Wilfrid Sellars (Does Emp.Knowledge have Foundation? [1956], p.123) | |||
| A reaction: McDowell has made the Kantian phrase 'the logical space of reasons' very popular. This is a very nice statement of the internalist view of justification, with which I sympathise more and more. It is a rationalist coherentist view. It needn't be mystical! |
| 8792 | Observations like 'this is green' presuppose truths about what is a reliable symptom of what |
| Full Idea: Observational knowledge of any particular fact, e.g. that this is green, presupposes that one knows general facts of the form 'X is a reliable symptom of Y'. | |||
| From: Wilfrid Sellars (Does Emp.Knowledge have Foundation? [1956], p.123) | |||
| A reaction: This is a nicely observed version of the regress problem with justification. I would guess that foundationalists would simply deny that this further knowledge is required; 'this is green' arises out of the experience, but it is not an inference. |
| 8791 | The concept of 'green' involves a battery of other concepts |
| Full Idea: One can only have the concept of green by having a whole battery of concepts of which it is one element. | |||
| From: Wilfrid Sellars (Does Emp.Knowledge have Foundation? [1956], p.120) | |||
| A reaction: This points in the direction of holism about language and thought, but need not imply it. It might be that concepts have to be learned in small families. It is not clear, though, what is absolutely essential to 'green', except that it indicates colour. |