Ideas from 'Truth' by J.L. Austin [1950], by Theme Structure

[found in 'The Nature of Truth' (ed/tr Lynch, Michael P.) [MIT 2001,0-262-62145-2]].

green numbers give full details    |     back to texts     |     unexpand these ideas


3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
True sentences says the appropriate descriptive thing on the appropriate demonstrative occasion
                        Full Idea: A sentence is said to be true when the historic state of affairs to which it is correlated by the demonstrative conventions (the one to which it 'refers') is of a type with which the sentence used in making it is correlated by the descriptive conventions.
                        From: J.L. Austin (Truth [1950], 3)
                        A reaction: This is correspondence by convention rather than correspondence by mapping. Personally I prefer some sort of mapping account, despite all the difficulty and vagueness of specifying what maps onto what.
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
Correspondence theorists shouldn't think that a country has just one accurate map
                        Full Idea: Correspondence theorists too often talk as one would who held that every map is either accurate or inaccurate; that every country can have but one accurate map.
                        From: J.L. Austin (Truth [1950], n 24)
                        A reaction: A well-made point, for those who intuitively hang on to correspondence as not only good common sense, but also some sort of salvation for a realist view of the world which might give us certainty in epistemology.