Ideas from 'The Fixation of Belief' by Charles Sanders Peirce [1877], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Philosophical Writings of Peirce' by Peirce,Charles Sanders (ed/tr Buchler,Justus) [Dover 1940,0-486-20217-8]].

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1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
Metaphysics does not rest on facts, but on what we are inclined to believe
                        Full Idea: Metaphysical systems have not usually rested upon any observed facts, or not in any great degree. They are chiefly adopted because their fundamental propositions seem 'agreeable to reason', which means that which we find ourselves inclined to believe.
                        From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877], p.15)
                        A reaction: This leads to Peirce's key claim - that we should allow our beliefs to be formed by something outside of ourselves. I don't share Peirce's contempt for metaphysics, which I take to be about the most abstract presuppositions of our ordinary beliefs.
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
Reason aims to discover the unknown by thinking about the known
                        Full Idea: The object of reasoning is to find out, from the consideration of what we already know, something else which we do not know.
                        From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877], p. 7)
                        A reaction: I defy anyone to come up with a better definition of reasoning than that. The emphasis is on knowledge rather than truth, which you would expect from a pragmatist. …Actually the definition doesn't cover conditional reasoning terribly well.
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
Realism is basic to the scientific method
                        Full Idea: The fundamental hypothesis of the method of science is this: There are real things, whose characters are entirely independent of our opinion of them.
                        From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877]), quoted by Albert Atkin - Peirce 3 'method'
                        A reaction: He admits later that this is only a commitment and not a fact. It seems to me that when you combine this idea with the huge success of science, the denial of realism is crazy. Philosophy has a lot to answer for.
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
If someone doubted reality, they would not actually feel dissatisfaction
                        Full Idea: Nobody can really doubt that there are Reals, for, if he did, doubt would not be a source of dissatisfaction.
                        From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877], p.19)
                        A reaction: This rests on Peirce's view that all that really matters is a sense of genuine dissatisfaction, rather than a theoretical idea. So even at the end of Meditation One, Descartes isn't actually worried about whether his furniture exists.
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
The feeling of belief shows a habit which will determine our actions
                        Full Idea: The feeling of believing is a more or less sure indication of there being established in our nature some habit which will determine our actions. Doubt never has such an effect.
                        From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877], p.10)
                        A reaction: It is one thing to assert this fairly accurate observation, and another to assert that this is the essence or definition of a belief. Perhaps it is the purpose of belief, without being the phenomenological essence of it. We act in states of uncertainty.
We are entirely satisfied with a firm belief, even if it is false
                        Full Idea: As soon as a firm belief is reached we are entirely satisfied, whether the belief be true or false.
                        From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877], p.10)
                        A reaction: This does not deny that the truth or falsehood of a belief is independent of whether we are satisfied with it. It is making a fair point, though, about why we believe things, and it can't be because of truth, because we don't know how to ensure that.
We want true beliefs, but obviously we think our beliefs are true
                        Full Idea: We seek for a belief that we shall think to be true; but we think each one of our beliefs to be true, and, indeed, it is mere tautology to say so.
                        From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877], p.11)
                        A reaction: If, as I do, you like to define belief as 'commitment to truth', Peirce makes a rather startling observation. You are rendered unable to ask whether your beliefs are true, because you have defined them as true. Nice point…
A mere question does not stimulate a struggle for belief; there must be a real doubt
                        Full Idea: The mere putting of a proposition into the interrogative form does not stimulate the mind to any struggle after belief; there must be a real and living doubt.
                        From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877], p.11)
                        A reaction: This the attractive aspect of Peirce's pragmatism, that he is always focusing on real life rather than abstract theory or pure logic.
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 2. Pragmatic justification
We need our beliefs to be determined by some external inhuman permanency
                        Full Idea: It is necessary that a method should be found by which our beliefs be determined by nothing human, but by some external permanency - by something upon which our thinking has no effect.
                        From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877]), quoted by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason Ch.5
                        A reaction: This very sensible and interesting remark hovers somewhere between empiricism and pragmatism. Fogelin very persuasively builds his account of knowledge on it. The key point is that we hardly ever choose what to believe. See Idea 2454.
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
Demonstration does not rest on first principles of reason or sensation, but on freedom from actual doubt
                        Full Idea: It is a common idea that demonstration must rest on indubitable propositions, either first principles of a general nature, or first sensations; but actual demonstration is completely satisfactory if it starts from propositions free from all actual doubt.
                        From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877], p.11)
                        A reaction: Another nice example of Peirce focusing on the practical business of thinking, rather than abstract theory. I agree with this approach, that explanation and proof do not aim at perfection and indubitability, but at what satisfies a critical mind.
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
Doubts should be satisfied by some external permanency upon which thinking has no effect
                        Full Idea: To satisfy our doubts it is necessary that a method should be found by which our beliefs may be determined by nothing human, but by some external permanency - by something upon which our thinking has no effect.
                        From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877], p.18)
                        A reaction: This may be the single most important idea in pragmatism and in the philosophy of science. See Fodor on experiments (Idea 2455). Put the question to nature. The essential aim is to be passive in our beliefs - just let reality form them.
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
Once doubt ceases, there is no point in continuing to argue
                        Full Idea: Some people seem to love to argue a point after all the world is fully convinced of it. But no further advance can be made. When doubt ceases, mental action on the subject comes to an end; and, if it did go on, it would be without purpose.
                        From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877], p.11)
                        A reaction: This is the way Peirce's pragmatism, which deals with how real thinking actually works (rather than abstract logic), deals with scepticism. However, there is a borderline where almost everyone is satisfied, but the very wise person remains sceptical.
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 2. Defining Kinds
What is true of one piece of copper is true of another (unlike brass)
                        Full Idea: The guiding principle is that what is true of one piece of copper is true of another; such a guiding principle with regard to copper would be much safer than with regard to many other substances - brass, for example.
                        From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877], p. 8)
                        A reaction: Peirce is so beautifully simple and sensible. This gives the essential notion of a natural kind, and is a key notion in our whole understanding of physical reality.
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
Natural selection might well fill an animal's mind with pleasing thoughts rather than true ones
                        Full Idea: It is probably of more advantage to an animal to have his mind filled with pleasing and encouraging visions, independently of their truth; and thus, upon unpractical subjects, natural selection might occasion a fallacious tendency of thought.
                        From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877], p. 8)
                        A reaction: Note that this is a pragmatist saying that a set of beliefs might work fine but be untrue. So Peirce does not have the highly relativistic notion of truth of some later pragmatists. Good for him. Note the early date to be thinking about Darwin.
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / d. Pascal's Wager
If death is annihilation, belief in heaven is a cheap pleasure with no disappointment
                        Full Idea: If death is annihilation, then the man who believes that he will certainly go straight to heaven when he dies, provided he have fulfilled certain simple observances in this life, has a cheap pleasure which will not be followed by the least disappointment.
                        From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877], p.12)
                        A reaction: This is a nicely wicked summary of one side of Pascal's options. All the problems of the argument are built into Peirce's word "cheap". Peirce goes on to talk about ostriches burying their heads.