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| 7661 | Truth is the opinion fated to be ultimately agreed by all investigators |
| Full Idea: The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate, is what we mean by the truth, and the object represented in this opinion is the real. | |||
| From: Charles Sanders Peirce (How to Make our Ideas Clear [1878], p.38) | |||
| A reaction: At least this affirms that truth is an ideal about which we dream, and is not confined merely to what we can actually know. But it rules out anything beyond the reach of all investigation, which seems a misconception of truth. What could angels know? |
| 19089 | Our whole conception of an object is its possible practical consequences |
| Full Idea: Consider what effects, which might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the objects of our conceptions to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object. | |||
| From: Charles Sanders Peirce (How to Make our Ideas Clear [1878], EP i.132), quoted by Albert Atkin - Peirce 2 'early' | |||
| A reaction: This is his 1878 version, which was fine-tuned later in life. He seems to have extended his principle to include possibilities, as well as the mere objects. That is, he moved beyond mere nominalism. |
| 7660 | We are aware of beliefs, they appease our doubts, and they are rules of action, or habits |
| Full Idea: A belief has just three properties: first, it is something that we are aware of; second, it appeases the irritation of doubt; and, third, it involves the establishment in our nature of a rule of action, or, say for short, a habit. | |||
| From: Charles Sanders Peirce (How to Make our Ideas Clear [1878], p.28) | |||
| A reaction: Peirce probably believed that Bismarck breathed oxygen, but was unaware of his belief, and no one ever dreamed of acting on such a belief, unless Bismarck was gasping for air. |
| 14906 | Non-positivist verificationism says only take a hypothesis seriously if it is scientifically based and testable |
| Full Idea: With Peirce, we endorse a non-positivist version of verificationism - no hypothesis should be taken seriously if apparently beyond our capacity to investigate, and serious metaphysics must concern at least two plausible scientific hypotheses. | |||
| From: comment on Charles Sanders Peirce (How to Make our Ideas Clear [1878]) by J Ladyman / D Ross - Every Thing Must Go 1.3 | |||
| A reaction: [compressed] They say this is NOT a theory about meaning, as 'The Big Bang was caused by Elvis' is perfectly meaningful. Verificationism always seems to rule out bold speculation. Don't say 'take string theory seriously', if we can't test it? |