Ideas from 'works' by Jacques Derrida [1990], by Theme Structure
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1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
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21887
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Derrida focuses on other philosophers, rather than on science
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1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
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21888
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Philosophy is just a linguistic display
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1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / e. Philosophy as reason
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21896
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Philosophy aims to build foundations for thought [May]
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1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
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21893
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Philosophy is necessarily metaphorical, and its writing is aesthetic
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1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 3. Hermeneutics
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21892
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Interpretations can be interpreted, so there is no original 'meaning' available
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20925
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Hermeneutics blunts truth, by conforming it to the interpreter [Zimmermann,J]
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20934
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Hermeneutics is hostile, trying to overcome the other person's difference [Zimmermann,J]
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1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 4. Linguistic Structuralism
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21895
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Structuralism destroys awareness of dynamic meaning
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1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 6. Deconstruction
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21881
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We aim to explore the limits of expression (as in Mallarmé's poetry)
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21883
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Sincerity can't be verified, so fiction infuses speech, and hence reality also
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21934
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The idea of being as persistent presence, and meaning as conscious intelligibility, are self-destructive [Glendinning]
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21882
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Sentences are contradictory, as they have opposite meanings in some contexts
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3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 9. Rejecting Truth
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4756
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Derrida says that all truth-talk is merely metaphor [Engel]
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21877
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True thoughts are inaccessible, in the subconscious, prior to speech or writing
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5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
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21878
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Names have a subjective aspect, especially the role of our own name
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21889
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'I' is the perfect name, because it denotes without description
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5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
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21879
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Even Kripke can't explain names; the word is the thing, and the thing is the word
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15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / b. Essence of consciousness
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21890
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Heidegger showed that passing time is the key to consciousness
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18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
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21880
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'Tacit theory' controls our thinking (which is why Freud is important)
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19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
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21886
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Meanings depend on differences and contrasts
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21930
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For Aristotle all proper nouns must have a single sense, which is the purpose of language
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21884
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Capacity for repetitions is the hallmark of language
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21933
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Writing functions even if the sender or the receiver are absent [Glendinning]
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21935
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The sign is only conceivable as a movement between elusive presences
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21894
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Madness and instability ('the demonic hyperbole') lurks in all language
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19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 9. Ambiguity
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21931
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'Dissemination' is opposed to polysemia, since that is irreducible, because of multiple understandings [Glendinning]
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19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 10. Denial of Meanings
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21885
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Words exist in 'spacing', so meanings are never synchronic except in writing
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22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / a. Form of the Good
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21891
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The good is implicitly violent (against evil), so there is no pure good
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