green numbers give full details | back to texts | unexpand these ideas
| 4894 | I say Mary does not have new knowledge, but knows an old fact in a new way |
| Full Idea: I say Mary knows an old fact in a new way, but I do not find a new bit of knowledge and a new fact. | |||
| From: comment on Frank Jackson (What Mary Didn't Know [1986]) by John Perry - Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness §7.3 | |||
| A reaction: This seems roughly the right way to attack Jackson's 'knowledge argument', by asking exactly what he means by 'knowledge'. It is hard to see how 'qualia' can be both the means of acquiring knowledge, and the thing itself. |
| 4895 | Is it unfair that physicalist knowledge can be written down, but dualist knowledge can't be |
| Full Idea: Jackson seems to imply that it isn't fair that all physicalist knowledge can be written down, but not all dualist knowledge can be. | |||
| From: comment on Frank Jackson (What Mary Didn't Know [1986]) by John Perry - Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness §7.5 | |||
| A reaction: This pinpoints a problem for the 'Mary' example - that Mary's new sight of colour is claimed as 'knowledge', and yet the whole point is that it cannot be expressed in propositions (which seems to leave it as 'procedural' or 'acquaintance' knowledge). |
| 4886 | Mary knows all the physical facts of seeing red, but experiencing it is new knowledge |
| Full Idea: Mary knows all the physical facts. ..It seems, however, that Mary does not know all there is to know. For when she is let out of the black and white room .. she will learn what it is like to see something red. | |||
| From: Frank Jackson (What Mary Didn't Know [1986], §1.4) | |||
| A reaction: Jackson is begging the question. A new physical event occurs when the red wavelength stimulates Mary's visual cortex for the first time. For an empiricist raw experience creates knowledge, so it can't BE knowledge. Does Mary acquire a new concept? |