Ideas from 'The Problem of Counterfactual Conditionals' by Nelson Goodman [1947], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Semantics and the Philosophy of Language' (ed/tr Linsky,Leonard) [University of Illinois 1972,0-252-00093-5]].

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10. Modality / B. Possibility / 9. Counterfactuals
Counterfactuals are true if logical or natural laws imply the consequence
                        Full Idea: Goodman's central idea was: 'If that match had been scratched, it would have lighted' is true if there are suitable truths from which, with the antecedent, the consequent can be inferred by means of a logical, or more typically natural, law.
                        From: report of Nelson Goodman (The Problem of Counterfactual Conditionals [1947]) by Ian McFetridge - Logical Necessity: Some Issues 4
                        A reaction: Goodman then discusses the problem of identifying the natural laws, and identifying the suitable truths. I'm inclined to think counterfactuals are vaguer than that; they are plausible if coherent reasons can be offered for the inference.