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| 9216 | Each area of enquiry, and its source, has its own distinctive type of necessity |
| Full Idea: The three sources of necessity - the identity of things, the natural order, and the normative order - have their own peculiar forms of necessity. The three main areas of human enquiry - metaphysics, science and ethics - each has its own necessity. | |||
| From: Kit Fine (The Varieties of Necessity [2002], 6) | |||
| A reaction: I would treat necessity in ethics with caution, if it is not reducible to natural or metaphysical necessity. Fine's proposal is interesting, but I did not find it convincing, especially in its view that metaphysical necessity doesn't intrude into nature. |
| 9214 | Unsupported testimony may still be believable |
| Full Idea: I may have good reason to believe some testimony, for example, even though the person providing the testimony has no good reason for saying what he does. | |||
| From: Kit Fine (The Varieties of Necessity [2002], 5) | |||
| A reaction: Thus small children, madmen and dreamers may occasionally get things right without realising it. I take testimony to be merely one more batch of evidence which has to be assessed in building the most coherent picture possible. |
| 9215 | Causation is easier to disrupt than logic, so metaphysics is part of nature, not vice versa |
| Full Idea: It would be harder to break P-and-Q implying P than the connection between cause and effect. This difference in strictness means it is more plausible that natural necessities include metaphysical necessities, than vice versa. | |||
| From: Kit Fine (The Varieties of Necessity [2002], 6) | |||
| A reaction: I cannot see any a priori grounds for the claim that causation is more easily disrupted than logic. It seems to be based on the strategy of inferring possibilities from what can be imagined, which seems to me to lead to wild misunderstandings. |