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| 5500 | Biologists see many organic levels, 'abstract' if seen from below, 'structural' if seen from above |
| Full Idea: Biologists don't split living things into a 'structural' level and an 'abstract' level; ..rather, they are organised at many levels, each level 'abstract' with respect to those beneath it, but 'structural' as it realises those levels above it. | |||
| From: William Lycan (Introduction - Ontology [1999], p.9) | |||
| A reaction: This is a very helpful distinction. Compare Idea 4601. It seems to fit well with the 'homuncular' picture of a hierarchical mind, and explains why there are so many levels of description available for mental life. |
| 5494 | 'Lightning is electric discharge' and 'Phosphorus is Venus' are synthetic a posteriori identities |
| Full Idea: There is such a thing as synthetic and a posteriori identity that is nonetheless genuine identity, as in lightning being electrical discharge, and the Morning Star being Venus. | |||
| From: William Lycan (Introduction - Ontology [1999], p.5) | |||
| A reaction: It is important to note that although these identities are synthetic a posteriori, that doesn't make them contingent. The early identity theorists like Smart seemed to think that it did. Kripke must be right that they are necessary identities. |
| 5496 | Functionalism has three linked levels: physical, functional, and mental |
| Full Idea: Functionalism has three distinct levels of description: a neurophysiological description, a functional description (relative to a program which the brain is realising), and it may have a further mental description. | |||
| From: William Lycan (Introduction - Ontology [1999], p.6) | |||
| A reaction: I have always thought that the 'levels of description' idea was very helpful in describing the mind/brain. I feel certain that we are dealing with a single thing, so this is the only way we can account for the diverse ways in which we discuss it. |
| 5499 | A mental state is a functional realisation of a brain state when it serves the purpose of the organism |
| Full Idea: Some theorists have said that the one-to-one correspondence between the organism and parts of its 'program' is too liberal, and suggest that the state and its functional role are seen teleologically, as functioning 'for' the organism. | |||
| From: William Lycan (Introduction - Ontology [1999], p.9) | |||
| A reaction: This seems an inevitable development, once the notion of a 'function' is considered. It has to be fitted into some sort of Aristotelian teleological picture, even if the functions are seen subjectively (by what?). Purpose is usually seen as evolutionary. |
| 5501 | People are trying to explain biological teleology in naturalistic causal terms |
| Full Idea: There is now a small but vigorous industry whose purpose is to explicate biological teleology in naturalistic terms, typically in terms of causes. | |||
| From: William Lycan (Introduction - Ontology [1999], p.10) | |||
| A reaction: This looks like a good strategy. In some sense, it seems clear that the moon has no purpose, but an eyeball has one. Via evolution, one would expect to reduce this to causation. Purposes are real (not subjective), but they are reducible. |