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| 12766 | Logical space is abstracted from the actual world |
| Full Idea: Logical space is not given independently of the individuals that occupy it, but is abstracted from the world as we find it. | |||
| From: Robert C. Stalnaker (Anti-essentialism [1979], p.85) | |||
| A reaction: I very much like the second half of this idea, and am delighted to find Stalnaker endorsing it. I take the logical connectives to be descriptions of how things behave, at a high level of generality. |
| 12764 | For the bare particular view, properties must be features, not just groups of objects |
| Full Idea: If we are to make sense of the bare particular theory, a property must be not just a rule for grouping individuals, but a feature of individuals in virtue of which they may be grouped. | |||
| From: Robert C. Stalnaker (Anti-essentialism [1979], p.76) | |||
| A reaction: He is offering an objection to the thoroughly extensional account of properties that is found in standard possible worlds semantics. Quite right too. We can't give up on the common sense notion of a property. |
| 12761 | An essential property is one had in all the possible worlds where a thing exists |
| Full Idea: If necessity is explained in terms of possible worlds, ...then an essential property is a property that a thing has in all possible worlds in which it exists. | |||
| From: Robert C. Stalnaker (Anti-essentialism [1979], p.71) | |||
| A reaction: This seems to me to be a quite shocking confusion of necessary properties with essential properties. The point is that utterly trivial properties can be necessary, but in no way part of the real essence of something. |
| 12763 | Necessarily self-identical, or being what it is, or its world-indexed properties, aren't essential |
| Full Idea: We can remain anti-essentialist while allowing some necessary properties: those essential to everything (self-identity), relational properties (being what it is), and world-indexed properties (being snub-nosed-only-in-Kronos). | |||
| From: Robert C. Stalnaker (Anti-essentialism [1979], p.73) | |||
| A reaction: [a summary] He defined essential properties as necessary properties (Idea 12761), and now backpeddles. World-indexed properties are an invention of Plantinga, as essential properties to don't limit individuals. But they are necessary, not essential! |
| 12762 | Bare particular anti-essentialism makes no sense within modal logic semantics |
| Full Idea: I argue that one cannot make semantical sense out of bare particular anti-essentialism within the framework of standard semantics for modal logic. | |||
| From: Robert C. Stalnaker (Anti-essentialism [1979], p.71) | |||
| A reaction: Stalnaker characterises the bare particular view as ANTI-essentialist, because he has defined essence in terms of necessary properties. The bare particular seems to allow the possibility of Aristotle being a poached egg. |
| 12765 | Why imagine that Babe Ruth might be a billiard ball; nothing useful could be said about the ball |
| Full Idea: I cannot think of any point in making the counterfactual supposition that Babe Ruth is a billiard ball; there is nothing I can say about him in that imagined state that I could not just as well say about billiard balls that are not him. | |||
| From: Robert C. Stalnaker (Anti-essentialism [1979], p.79) | |||
| A reaction: A bizarrely circumspect semanticists way of saying that Ruth couldn't possibly be a billiard ball! Would he say the same about a group of old men in wheelchairs, one of whom IS Babe Ruth? |