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16423 | Conceptual possibilities are metaphysical possibilities we can conceive of |
Full Idea: Conceptual possibilities are just (metaphysical) possibilities that we can conceive of. | |||
From: Robert C. Stalnaker (Conceptual truth and metaphysical necessity [2003], 1) |
16422 | The necessity of a proposition concerns reality, not our words or concepts |
Full Idea: The necessity or contingency of a proposition has nothing to do with our concepts or the meanings of our words. The possibilities would have been the same even if we had never conceived of them. | |||
From: Robert C. Stalnaker (Conceptual truth and metaphysical necessity [2003], 1) | |||
A reaction: This sounds in need of qualification, since some of the propositions will be explicitly about words and concepts. Still, I like this idea. |
16421 | Critics say there are just an a priori necessary part, and an a posteriori contingent part |
Full Idea: Critics say there are no irreducible a posteriori truths. They can be factored into a part that is necessary, but knowable a priori through conceptual analysis, and a part knowable only a posteriori, but contingent. 2-D semantics makes this precise. | |||
From: Robert C. Stalnaker (Conceptual truth and metaphysical necessity [2003], 1) | |||
A reaction: [Critics are Sidelle, Jackson and Chalmers] Interesting. If gold is necessarily atomic number 79, or it wouldn't be gold, that sounds like an analytic truth about gold. Discovering the 79 wasn't a discovery of a necessity. Stalnaker rejects this idea. |
16429 | A 'centred' world is an ordered triple of world, individual and time |
Full Idea: A 'centred' possible world is an ordered triple consisting of a possible world, an individual in the domain of that world, and a time. | |||
From: Robert C. Stalnaker (Conceptual truth and metaphysical necessity [2003], 2) |
16428 | Meanings aren't in the head, but that is because they are abstract |
Full Idea: Meanings ain't in the head. Putnam's famous slogan actually fits Frege's anti-psychologism better than it fits Purnam's and Burge's anti-individualism. The point is that intensions of any kind are abstract objects. | |||
From: Robert C. Stalnaker (Conceptual truth and metaphysical necessity [2003], 2) | |||
A reaction: If intensions are abstract, that leaves (for me) the question of what they are abstracted from. I take it that there are specific brain events that are being abstractly characterised. What do we call those? |
16432 | One view says the causal story is built into the description that is the name's content |
Full Idea: In 'causal descriptivism' the causal story is built into the description that is the content of the name (and also incorporates a rigidifying operator to ensure that the descriptions that names abbreviate have wide scope). | |||
From: Robert C. Stalnaker (Conceptual truth and metaphysical necessity [2003], 5) | |||
A reaction: Not very controversial, I would say, since virtually every fact about the world has a 'causal story' built into it. Must we insist on rigidity in order to have wide scope? |
16430 | Two-D says that a posteriori is primary and contingent, and the necessity is the secondary intension |
Full Idea: Two-dimensionalism says the necessity of a statement is constituted by the fact that the secondary intensions is a necessary proposition, and their a posteriori character is constituted by the fact that the associated primary intension is contingent. | |||
From: Robert C. Stalnaker (Conceptual truth and metaphysical necessity [2003], 2) | |||
A reaction: This view is found in Sidelle 1989, and then formalised by Jackson and Chalmers. I like metaphysical necessity, but I have some sympathy with the approach. The question must always be 'where does this necessity derive from'? |
16431 | In one view, the secondary intension is metasemantic, about how the thinker relates to the content |
Full Idea: On the metasemantic interpretation of the two-dimensional framework, the second dimension is used to represent the metasemantic facts about the relation between a thinker or speaker and the contents of her thoughts or utterances. | |||
From: Robert C. Stalnaker (Conceptual truth and metaphysical necessity [2003], 4) | |||
A reaction: I'm struggling to think what facts there might be about the relation between myself and the contents of my thoughts. I'm more or less constituted by my thoughts. |