Ideas from 'The Varieties of Reference' by Gareth Evans [1980], by Theme Structure

[found in 'The Varieties of Reference' by Evans,Gareth [OUP 2002,0-19-824686-2]].

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12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
Experiences have no conceptual content
                        Full Idea: In Evans's work experiences are conceived of as not having a conceptual content at all.
                        From: report of Gareth Evans (The Varieties of Reference [1980]) by John Greco - Justification is not Internal
                        A reaction: I presume it is this view which provoked McDowell's contrary view in 'Mind and World'. I say this is a job for neuroscience, and I struggle to see what philosophical questions hang on the outcome. I think I side with Evans.
We have far fewer colour concepts than we have discriminations of colour
                        Full Idea: Do we really understand the proposal that we have as many colour concepts as there are shades colour that we can sensibly discriminate?
                        From: Gareth Evans (The Varieties of Reference [1980], 7.5)
                        A reaction: This is the argument (rejected by McDowell) that experience cannot be conceptual because experience is too rich. We should not confuse lack of concepts with lack of words. I may have a concept of a colour between two shades, but no word for it.
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
Some representational states, like perception, may be nonconceptual
                        Full Idea: Evans introduced the idea that there are some representational states, for example perceptual experiences, which have content that is nonconceptual.
                        From: report of Gareth Evans (The Varieties of Reference [1980]) by Peter Schulte - Mental Content 3.4
                        A reaction: McDowell famously disagree, and whether all experience is inherently conceptualised is a main debate from that period. Hard to see how it could be settled, but I incline to McDowell, because minimal perception hardly counts as 'experience'.
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts
The Generality Constraint says if you can think a predicate you can apply it to anything
                        Full Idea: If a subject can be credited with the thought that a is F, then he must have the conceptual resources for entertaining the thought that a is G, for every property of being G of which he has conception. This condition I call the 'Generality Constraint'.
                        From: Gareth Evans (The Varieties of Reference [1980], p.104), quoted by François Recanati - Mental Files 5.3
                        A reaction: Recanati endorses the Constraint in his account of mental files. Apparently if I can entertain the thought of a circle being round, I can also entertain the thought of it being square, so I am not too sure about this one.
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / b. Concepts as abilities
Concepts have a 'Generality Constraint', that we must know how predicates apply to them
                        Full Idea: Evans's 'Generality Constraint' says that if a thinker is capable of attitudes to the content Fa and possesses the singular concept b, then he is capable of having attitudes to the content Fb.
                        From: report of Gareth Evans (The Varieties of Reference [1980], 4.3) by Christopher Peacocke - A Study of Concepts 1.1
                        A reaction: So having an attitude becomes the test of whether one possesses a concept. I suppose if one says 'You know you've got a concept when you are capable of thinking about it', that is much the same thing. Sounds fine.