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Ideas from 'Properties and Predicates' by D.H. Mellor [1991], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Properties' (ed/tr Mellor,D.H. /Oliver,A) [OUP 1997,0-19-875176-1]].

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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 2. Need for Properties
8568 A property is merely a constituent of laws of nature; temperature is just part of thermodynamics
                        Full Idea: Being a constituent of probabilistic laws of nature is all there is to being a property. There is no more to temperature than the thermodynamics and other laws they occur in.
                        From: D.H. Mellor (Properties and Predicates [1991], 'Props')
                        A reaction: How could thermodynamics be worked out without a prior concept of temperature? I think it is at least plausible to deny that there are any 'laws' of nature. But even Quine can't deny that some things are too hot to touch.
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
8564 There is obviously a possible predicate for every property
                        Full Idea: To every property there obviously corresponds a possible predicate applying to all and only those particulars with that property.
                        From: D.H. Mellor (Properties and Predicates [1991], 'Intro')
                        A reaction: This doesn't strike me as at all obvious. If nature dictates the properties, there may be vastly more than any human language could cope with. It is daft to say that a property can only exist if humanity can come up with a predicate for it.
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
8566 We need universals for causation and laws of nature; the latter give them their identity
                        Full Idea: I take the main reason for believing in contingent universals to be the roles they play in causation and in laws of nature, and those laws are what I take to give those universals their identity.
                        From: D.H. Mellor (Properties and Predicates [1991], 'Props')
                        A reaction: He agrees with Armstrong. Sounds a bit circular - laws are built on universals, and universals are identified by laws. It resembles a functionalist account of mental events. I think it is wrong. A different account of laws will be needed...
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 3. Predicate Nominalism
8565 If properties were just the meanings of predicates, they couldn't give predicates their meaning
                        Full Idea: One reason for denying that properties just are the meanings of our predicates is that, if they were, they could not give our predicates their meanings.
                        From: D.H. Mellor (Properties and Predicates [1991], 'Props')
                        A reaction: Neither way round sounds quite right to me. Predicate nominalism is wrong, but what is meant by a property 'giving' a predicate its meaning? It doesn't seem to allow room for error in our attempts to name the properties.
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / e. Probabilistic causation
8567 Singular causation requires causes to raise the physical probability of their effects
                        Full Idea: Singular causation entails physical probabilities or chances. ...Causal laws require causes to raise their effects' chances, as when fires have a greater chance of occurring when explosions do.
                        From: D.H. Mellor (Properties and Predicates [1991], 'Props')
                        A reaction: It seems fairly obvious that a probability can be increased without actually causing something. Just after a harmless explosion is a good moment for arsonists, especially if Mellor will be the investigating officer.