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| 8502 | Realism doesn't explain 'a is F' any further by saying it is 'a has F-ness' |
| Full Idea: Realists feel that the one-place predication 'a is F' leaves something unexplained, yet all that is offered is a two-place predication (a relational statement). There is an equal problem about 'a having F-ness'. | |||
| From: Michael Devitt ('Ostrich Nominalism' or 'Mirage Realism'? [1980], p.97) | |||
| A reaction: I think this is a key argument on the nominalist side - the denial that the theory of universals actually makes any progress at all in giving an explanation of what is going on around here. Platonist have the problem of 'partaking'. |
| 8503 | The particular/universal distinction is unhelpful clutter; we should accept 'a is F' as basic |
| Full Idea: Talk of 'particulars' and 'universals' clutters the landscape without adding to our understanding. We should rest with the basic fact that a is F. | |||
| From: Michael Devitt ('Ostrich Nominalism' or 'Mirage Realism'? [1980], p.98) | |||
| A reaction: Ramsey was first to challenge the basic distinction. I find the approach of Quine and Devitt unsatisfactory. We abandon explanation when it is totally hopeless, but that is usually in the face of complexity. Properties are difficult but simple. |
| 8501 | Quineans take predication about objects as basic, not reference to properties they may have |
| Full Idea: For 'a and b have the same property, F-ness' the Quinean Nominalist has a paraphrase to hand: 'a and b are both F'. ..In denying that this object need have properties, the Quinean is not denying that it really is F. | |||
| From: Michael Devitt ('Ostrich Nominalism' or 'Mirage Realism'? [1980], p.95) | |||
| A reaction: The question that remains is why 'F' is used of both a and b. We don't call a and b 'a', because they are different. Quine falls back on resemblance. I suspect Quineans of hiding behind the semantics. |