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21677 | How can the not-true fail to be false, or the not-false fail to be true? |
Full Idea: How can something that is not true not be false, or how can something that is not false not be true? | |||
From: M. Tullius Cicero (On Fate ('De fato') [c.44 BCE], 16.38) | |||
A reaction: We must at least distinguish between whether the contrary thing is not actually true, or whether we are prepared to assert that it is not true. The disjunction may seem to be a false dichotomy. 'He isn't good' may not entail 'he is evil'. |
21667 | Oratory and philosophy are closely allied; orators borrow from philosophy, and ornament it |
Full Idea: There is a close alliance between the orator and the philosophical system of which I am a follower, since the orator borrows subtlely from the Academy, and repays the loan by giving to it a copious and flowing style and rhetorical ornament. | |||
From: M. Tullius Cicero (On Fate ('De fato') [c.44 BCE], 02.03) | |||
A reaction: It is a misundertanding to think that rhetoric and philosophy are seen as in necessary opposition. Philosophers just seemed to think that oratory works a lot better if it is truthful. |
21678 | If desire is not in our power then neither are choices, so we should not be praised or punished |
Full Idea: If the cause of desire is not situated within us, even desire itself is also not in our power. ...It follows that neither assent nor action is in our power. Hence there is no justice in either praise or blame, either honours or punishments. | |||
From: M. Tullius Cicero (On Fate ('De fato') [c.44 BCE], 17.40) | |||
A reaction: This is the view of 'old philosophers', but I'm unsure which ones. Cicero spurns this view. It is obvious that the causes of our desires are largely out of our control. Responsibility seems to concern what we do about our desires. |