Ideas from 'Vagueness' by Bertrand Russell [1923], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Vagueness: a Reader' (ed/tr Keefe,R /Smith,P) [MIT 1999,0-262-61145-7]].

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5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
Logical connectives have the highest precision, yet are infected by the vagueness of true and false
                        Full Idea: Russell says the best chance of avoiding vagueness are the logical connectives. ...But the vagueness of 'true' and 'false' infects the logical connectives too. All words are vague. Russell concludes that all language is vague.
                        From: report of Bertrand Russell (Vagueness [1923]) by Timothy Williamson - Vagueness 2.4
                        A reaction: This relies on the logical connectives being defined semantically, in terms of T and F, but that is standard. Presumably the formal uninterpreted syntax is not vague.
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / d. Vagueness as linguistic
Since natural language is not precise it cannot be in the province of logic
                        Full Idea: Russell takes it that logic assumes precision, and since natural language is not precise it cannot be in the province of logic at all.
                        From: report of Bertrand Russell (Vagueness [1923]) by R Keefe / P Smith - Intro: Theories of Vagueness §1
                        A reaction: I find this view congenial. It seems to me that the necessary prelude to logic is to do everything you can to eliminate ambiguity and vagueness from the sentences at issue. We want the proposition, or logical form. If there isn't one, forget it?
Vagueness is only a characteristic of representations, such as language
                        Full Idea: Vagueness and precision alike are characteristics which can only belong to a representation, of which language is an example.
                        From: Bertrand Russell (Vagueness [1923], p.62)
                        A reaction: Russell was the first to tackle the question of vagueness, and he may have got it right. If we are unable to decide which set an object belongs in (red or orange) that is a problem for our conceptual/linguistic scheme. The object still has a colour!