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| 7454 | Gassendi is the first great empiricist philosopher |
| Full Idea: Gassendi is the first in the great line of empiricist philosophers that gradually came to dominate European thought. | |||
| From: Ian Hacking (The Emergence of Probability [1975], Ch.5) | |||
| A reaction: Epicurus, of course, was clearly an empiricist. British readers should note that Gassendi was not British. |
| 7447 | Probability was fully explained between 1654 and 1812 |
| Full Idea: There is hardly any history of probability to record before Pascal (1654), and the whole subject is very well understood after Laplace (1812). | |||
| From: Ian Hacking (The Emergence of Probability [1975], Ch.1) | |||
| A reaction: An interesting little pointer on the question of whether the human race is close to exhausting all the available intellectual problems. What then? |
| 7448 | Probability is statistical (behaviour of chance devices) or epistemological (belief based on evidence) |
| Full Idea: Probability has two aspects: the degree of belief warranted by evidence, and the tendency displayed by some chance device to produce stable relative frequencies. These are the epistemological and statistical aspects of the subject. | |||
| From: Ian Hacking (The Emergence of Probability [1975], Ch.1) | |||
| A reaction: The most basic distinction in the subject. Later (p.124) he suggests that the statistical form (known as 'aleatory' probability) is de re, and the other is de dicto. |
| 7449 | Epistemological probability based either on logical implications or coherent judgments |
| Full Idea: Epistemological probability is torn between Keynes etc saying it depends on the strength of logical implication, and Ramsey etc saying it is personal judgement which is subject to strong rules of internal coherence. | |||
| From: Ian Hacking (The Emergence of Probability [1975], Ch.2) | |||
| A reaction: See Idea 7449 for epistemological probability. My immediate intuition is that the Ramsey approach sounds much more plausible. In real life there are too many fine-grained particulars involved for straight implication to settle a probability. |
| 7450 | In the medieval view, only deduction counted as true evidence |
| Full Idea: In the medieval view, evidence short of deduction was not really evidence at all. | |||
| From: Ian Hacking (The Emergence of Probability [1975], Ch.3) | |||
| A reaction: Hacking says the modern concept of evidence comes with probability in the 17th century. That might make it one of the most important ideas ever thought of, allowing us to abandon certainties and live our lives in a more questioning way. |
| 7451 | Formerly evidence came from people; the new idea was that things provided evidence |
| Full Idea: In the medieval view, people provided the evidence of testimony and of authority. What was lacking was the seventeenth century idea of the evidence provided by things. | |||
| From: Ian Hacking (The Emergence of Probability [1975], Ch.4) | |||
| A reaction: A most intriguing distinction, which seems to imply a huge shift in world-view. The culmination of this is Peirce's pragmatism, in Idea 6948, of which I strongly approve. |
| 7452 | An experiment is a test, or an adventure, or a diagnosis, or a dissection |
| Full Idea: An experiment is a test (if T, then E implies R, so try E, and if R follows, T seems right), an adventure (no theory, but try things), a diagnosis (reading the signs), or a dissection (taking apart). | |||
| From: report of Ian Hacking (The Emergence of Probability [1975], Ch.4) by PG - Db (ideas) | |||
| A reaction: A nice analysis. The Greeks did diagnosis, then the alchemists tried adventures, then Vesalius began dissections, then the followers of Bacon concentrated on the test, setting up controlled conditions. 'If you don't believe it, try it yourself'. |
| 7459 | Follow maths for necessary truths, and jurisprudence for contingent truths |
| Full Idea: Mathematics is the model for reasoning about necessary truths, but jurisprudence must be our model when we deliberate about contingencies. | |||
| From: Ian Hacking (The Emergence of Probability [1975], Ch.10) | |||
| A reaction: Interesting. Certainly huge thinking, especially since the Romans, has gone into the law, and creating rules of evidence. Maybe all philosophers should study law and mathematics? |