Ideas from 'What is a Law of Nature?' by David M. Armstrong [1983], by Theme Structure

[found in 'What is a Law of Nature?' by Armstrong,D.M. [CUP 1985,0-521-31481-x]].

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1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 7. Limitations of Analysis

17663

If you know what it is, investigation is pointless. If you don't, investigation is impossible

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / b. Types of fact

17688

Negative facts are supervenient on positive facts, suggesting they are positive facts

8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 4. Formal Relations / a. Types of relation

17691

Nothing is genuinely related to itself

8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties

17679

All instances of some property are strictly identical

8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties

12677

Armstrong holds that all basic properties are categorical [Ellis]

8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 7. Against Powers

17666

Actualism means that ontology cannot contain what is merely physically possible

17667

Dispositions exist, but their truth-makers are actual or categorical properties

17687

If everything is powers there is a vicious regress, as powers are defined by more powers

8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals

17678

Universals are just the repeatable features of a world

8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals

17669

Realist regularity theories of laws need universals, to pick out the same phenomena

8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 3. Instantiated Universals

15442

Universals are abstractions from their particular instances [Lewis]

17686

Universals are abstractions from states of affairs

17677

Past, present and future must be equally real if universals are instantiated

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / b. Individuation by properties

17668

It is likely that particulars can be individuated by unique conjunctions of properties

9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity

17680

The identity of a thing with itself can be ruled out as a pseudo-property

10. Modality / B. Possibility / 5. Contingency

17693

The necessary/contingent distinction may need to recognise possibilities as real

14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction

17685

Induction aims at 'all Fs', but abduction aims at hidden or theoretical entities

14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / a. Grue problem

17683

Science suggests that the predicate 'grue' is not a genuine single universal

17675

Unlike 'green', the 'grue' predicate involves a time and a change

14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / b. Raven paradox

17674

The raven paradox has three disjuncts, confirmed by confirming any one of them

14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation

17672

A good reason for something (the smoke) is not an explanation of it (the fire)

14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations

17684

To explain observations by a regular law is to explain the observations by the observations

14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / a. Best explanation

17676

Best explanations explain the most by means of the least

18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 1. Abstract Thought

17664

Each subject has an appropriate level of abstraction

26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / e. The One

17692

We can't deduce the phenomena from the One

26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Types of cause

17689

Absences might be effects, but surely not causes?

26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature

17662

Science depends on laws of nature to study unobserved times and spaces

17682

A universe couldn't consist of mere laws

26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 2. Types of Laws

17690

Oaken conditional laws, Iron universal laws, and Steel necessary laws [PG]

26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 3. Laws and Generalities

17670

Newton's First Law refers to bodies not acted upon by a force, but there may be no such body

26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory

8582	Regularities are lawful if a second-order universal unites two first-order universals [Lewis]

17671

A naive regularity view says if it never occurs then it is impossible

26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 5. Laws from Universals

17681

The laws of nature link properties with properties

16246

Rather than take necessitation between universals as primitive, just make laws primitive [Maudlin]

9480	Armstrong has an unclear notion of contingent necessitation, which can't necessitate anything [Bird]