Ideas from 'Interview with Baggini and Stangroom' by Simon Critchley [2001], by Theme Structure

[found in 'New British Philosophy' by Baggini,J/Stangroom,J [Routledge 2002,0-415-24346-7]].

green numbers give full details    |     back to texts     |     unexpand these ideas


1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 8. Humour
Humour is practically enacted philosophy
                        Full Idea: Humour, for me, is practically enacted philosophy.
                        From: Simon Critchley (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.198)
                        A reaction: This may be overstating it, as the funniest jokes may be the least philosophical, and remarks may be faintly amusing but very profound. Lear and his Fool make up a single worldview together.
Humour can give a phenomenological account of existence, and point to change
                        Full Idea: Humour provides an oblique phenomenology of ordinary life; it is a way of describing the situation of our existence, and, at its best, it indicates how we might change that situation.
                        From: Simon Critchley (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.198)
                        A reaction: The trouble is that this leads us to relentlessly political standup comedians who aren't very funny. Critichley may have a problem with remarks which are very funny precisely because they are so politically incorrect. I sympathise, though.
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
Scientism is the view that everything can be explained causally through scientific method
                        Full Idea: Scientism is the belief that all phenomena can be explained through the methodology of the natural sciences, and the belief that, therefore, all phenomena are capable of a causal explanation.
                        From: Simon Critchley (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.196)
                        A reaction: He links two ideas together, but I tend to subscribe fully to the second idea, but less fully to the first. Scientific method, if there is such a thing (Idea 6804), may not be the best way to lay bare the causal network of reality.
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 1. Continental Philosophy
German idealism aimed to find a unifying principle for Kant's various dualisms
                        Full Idea: In his Third Critique Kant established a series of dualisms (pure/practical reason, nature/freedom, epistemology/ethics) but failed to provide a unifying principle; German idealism can be seen as an attempt to provide this principle.
                        From: Simon Critchley (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.187)
                        A reaction: He cites 'subject', 'spirit', 'art', 'will to power', 'praxis' and 'being' as candidates. This is a helpful overview for someone struggling to get to grips with that tradition.
Since Hegel, continental philosophy has been linked with social and historical enquiry.
                        Full Idea: In continental philosophy from Hegel onwards, systematic philosophical questions have to be linked to socio-historical enquiry, and the distinctions between philosophy, history and society begin to fall apart.
                        From: Simon Critchley (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.188)
                        A reaction: I have a strong sales resistance to this view of philosophy, just as I would if it was said about mathematics. It seems to imply a bogus view that history exhibits direction and purpose (the 'Whig' view). There are pure reasons among the prejudices.
Continental philosophy fights the threatened nihilism in the critique of reason
                        Full Idea: If reason must criticise itself (in Kant) how does one avoid total scepticism? In my view, the problem that has animated the continental tradition since Jacobi (early 19th cent) is the threat of nihilism.
                        From: Simon Critchley (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.188)
                        A reaction: As an outsider to 'continental' philosophy, this is the most illuminating remark I have read about it. It is not only a plausible account of the movement, but also a very worth aim, which should be taken seriously by analytical philosophers.
Continental philosophy is based on critique, praxis and emancipation
                        Full Idea: The basic map of the continental tradition can be summarised in three terms: critique, praxis and emancipation.
                        From: Simon Critchley (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.189)
                        A reaction: I wince at 'emancipation', which seems to take freedom as of unquestionably high value, instead of being one of the principles up for question in social philosophy. There are more presuppositions in Marxist than in analytical philosophy.
Continental philosophy has a bad tendency to offer 'one big thing' to explain everything
                        Full Idea: In continental philosophy there is a pernicious tendency to explain everything in terms of 'one big thing', such as the 'death drive' (Freud), 'being' (Heidegger), 'the real' (Lacan), 'power' (Foucault), 'the other' (Levinas), or 'différance' (Derrida).
                        From: Simon Critchley (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.197)
                        A reaction: From a fan of this type of philosophy, this is a refreshing remark, because if pinpoints a very off-putting feature. Each of these 'big things' should be up for question, not offered as axiomatic assumptions that explain everything else.
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 2. Phenomenology
Phenomenology is a technique of redescription which clarifies our social world
                        Full Idea: Phenomenology (as in the later Husserl) is for me a way of assembling reminders which clarify the social world in which we exist; it is a technique of redescription.
                        From: Simon Critchley (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.198)
                        A reaction: I'm not sure if I can identify with this as a target for philosophy, but it is interesting and sound worthy of effort. Critchley offers this as the best strand in 'continental' philosophy, rather than the big explanatory ideas.
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 2. Nihilism
Perceiving meaninglessness is an achievement, which can transform daily life
                        Full Idea: If nihilism is the threat of the collapse of meaning, then my position is that one has to accept meaninglessness as an achievement, as an accomplishment that permits a transformed relation to everyday life.
                        From: Simon Critchley (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.193)
                        A reaction: This sounds cheerfully upbeat and life-enhancing, but I don't quite see how it works. One could easily end up laughing at the most appalling tragedies, and that seems to me to be an inappropriate (Aristotelian word) way to respond to tragedy.