Ideas from 'Criterion of Validity in Reasoning' by Charles Sanders Peirce [1903], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Philosophical Writings of Peirce' by Peirce,Charles Sanders (ed/tr Buchler,Justus) [Dover 1940,0-486-20217-8]].

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2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
I reason in order to avoid disappointment and surprise
                        Full Idea: I do not reason for the sake of my delight in reasoning, but solely to avoid disappointment and surprise.
                        From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Criterion of Validity in Reasoning [1903], I)
                        A reaction: Hence Peirce places more emphasis on inductive and abductive reasoning than on deductive reasoning. I have to agree with him. Anyone account of why we reason must have an evolutionary framework. What advantage does reason bestow? It concerns the future.
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 1. Redundant Truth
That a judgement is true and that we judge it true are quite different things
                        Full Idea: Either J and the judgment 'I say that J is true' are the same for all judgments or for none. But if identical, their denials are identical. These are 'J is not true' and 'I do not say that J is true', which are different. No judgment judges itself true.
                        From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Criterion of Validity in Reasoning [1903], I)
                        A reaction: If you are going to espouse the Ramseyan redundancy view of truth, you had better make sure you are not guilty of the error which Peirce identifies here.
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic
Only study logic if you think your own reasoning is deficient
                        Full Idea: It is foolish to study logic unless one is persuaded that one's own reasonings are more or less bad.
                        From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Criterion of Validity in Reasoning [1903], II)
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 7. Facts / a. Facts
Facts are hard unmoved things, unaffected by what people may think of them
                        Full Idea: Facts are hard things which do not consist in my thinking so and so, but stand unmoved by whatever you or I or any man or generations of men may opine about them.
                        From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Criterion of Validity in Reasoning [1903], I)
                        A reaction: This is my view of facts, with which I am perfectly happy, for all the difficulties involved in individuating facts, and in disentangling them from our own modes of thought and expression. Let us try to establish the facts.