Ideas from 'World and Essence' by Alvin Plantinga [1970], by Theme Structure
[found in 'Essays in the Metaphysics of Modality' by Plantinga,Alvin [OUP 2003,0-19-510377-7]].
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expand these ideas
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Impossible objects
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16435
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Plantinga proposes necessary existent essences as surrogates for the nonexistent things [Stalnaker]
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9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
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14655
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The 'identity criteria' of a name are a group of essential and established facts
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9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
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14658
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'Being Socrates' and 'being identical with Socrates' characterise Socrates, so they are among his properties
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
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14656
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Does Socrates have essential properties, plus a unique essence (or 'haecceity') which entails them?
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
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14654
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Properties are 'trivially essential' if they are instantiated by every object in every possible world
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14653
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X is essentially P if it is P in every world, or in every X-world, or in the actual world (and not ¬P elsewhere)
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14660
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If a property is ever essential, can it only ever be an essential property?
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14661
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Essences are instantiated, and are what entails a thing's properties and lack of properties
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9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
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14657
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Does 'being identical with Socrates' name a property? I can think of no objections to it
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10. Modality / A. Necessity / 4. De re / De dicto modality
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14652
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'De re' modality is as clear as 'de dicto' modality, because they are logically equivalent
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10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
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14659
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We can imagine being beetles or alligators, so it is possible we might have such bodies
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