Ideas from 'Wittgenstein' by A.C. Grayling [1988], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Wittgenstein' by Grayling,A.C. [OUP 2001,0-19-285411-9]].

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15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / d. Other minds by analogy
The argument from analogy is not a strong inference, since the other being might be an actor or a robot
                        Full Idea: The argument from analogy is a weak one, because it does not logically guarantee the inference I draw to the other's inner states, for he might be dissimulating or acting, or may even be a cleverly contrived robot which feels nothing.
                        From: A.C. Grayling (Wittgenstein [1988], Ch.3)
                        A reaction: This gives the impression that for an argument to be strong it must logically guarantee its inference. It strikes me that analogy is a good reason for believing in other minds, but that is because I am looking for the best explanation, not logical proof.