Ideas from 'Letters to Russell' by Ludwig Wittgenstein [1919], by Theme Structure

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1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
The main problem of philosophy is what can and cannot be thought and expressed
                        Full Idea: The 'Tractatus' concerns the theory of what can be expressed by propositions (and, which comes to the same thing, can be thought), and what cannot be expressed by propositions, but can only be shown; which, I believe, is the main problem of philosophy.
                        From: report of Ludwig Wittgenstein (Letters to Russell [1919]) by A.C. Grayling - Wittgenstein Ch.2
                        A reaction: This contains what a I consider the heresy of making thought depend on language, but his main question remains, of the limits of thought. It is dramatised nicely in the 'mysterian' view of the mind-body problem (e.g. Idea 2540).
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / d. Logical atoms
Atomic facts correspond to true elementary propositions
                        Full Idea: Atomic fact [Sachverhalt] is what corresponds to an elementary proposition [Elementarsatz] if it is true.
                        From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Letters to Russell [1919], CL 125)
                        A reaction: This is perhaps the key to the Tractatus, because it is the binding point between world and language. A true realist would allow for atomic facts that may go beyond even possible propositions.
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
A thought is mental constituents that relate to reality as words do
                        Full Idea: Does a Gedanke [thought] consist of words? No! But of psychical constituents that have the same sort of relation to reality as words.
                        From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Letters to Russell [1919], p.125), quoted by Michael Morris - Guidebook to Wittgenstein's Tractatus 4B
                        A reaction: This is roughly my view of propositions, as non-lingustic mental events. The 'psychical constituents' seem to be concepts, in a psychological rather than a Fregean sense. This idea allowed transfer of his representation theory from thought to language.