Ideas from 'Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions' by Jean-Paul Sartre [1939], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Sketch for a Theory of Emotions' by Sartre,Jean-Paul [Routledge 1994,0-415-26752-8]].

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15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / b. Essence of consciousness
Consciousness always transcends itself
                        Full Idea: It is of the essence of consciousness to transcend itself
                        From: Jean-Paul Sartre (Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions [1939], §III)
                        A reaction: As usual, I am a bit baffled by these sorts of pronouncement. Sounds like an oxymoron to me. Maybe it is a development of Schopenhauer's thought.
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / a. Nature of emotions
An emotion and its object form a unity, so emotion is a mode of apprehension
                        Full Idea: Emotion returns to its object every moment, and feeds upon it. …The emotional subject and the object of the emotion are united in an indissoluble synthesis. Emotion is a specific manner of apprehending the world. …[39] It is a transformation of the world.
                        From: Jean-Paul Sartre (Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions [1939], §III)
                        A reaction: The last sentence is the essence (or existence?) of Sartre's core theory of the emotions. They are, it seems, a mode of perception, like a colour filter added to a camera. I don't think I agree. I see them as a response to perceptions, not part of them.
Emotion is one of our modes of understanding our Being-in-the-World
                        Full Idea: Emotion is not an accident, it is a mode of our conscious existence, one of the ways in which consciousness understands (in Heidegger's sense of verstehen) its Being-in-the-World. …It has a meaning.
                        From: Jean-Paul Sartre (Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions [1939], §III)
                        A reaction: Calling emotions a 'mode' suggests that this way of understanding is intermittent, which seems wrong. Even performing arithmetical calculations is coloured by emotions, so they go deeper than a 'mode'.
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / c. Role of emotions
Emotions are a sort of bodily incantation which brings a magic to the world
                        Full Idea: Joy is the magical behaviour which tries, by incantation, to realise the possession of the desired object as an instantaneous totality. [47] Emotions are all reducible to the constitution of a magic world by using our bodies as instruments of incantation.
                        From: Jean-Paul Sartre (Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions [1939], §III)
                        A reaction: I can't pretend to understand this, but I am reminded of the fact that the so-called primary qualities of perception are innately boring, and it is only the secondary qualities (like colour and smell) which make the world interesting.
Emotions makes us believe in and live in a new world
                        Full Idea: Emotion is a phenomenon of belief. Consciousness does not limit itself to the projection of affective meanings upon the world around it; it lives the new world it has thereby constituted.
                        From: Jean-Paul Sartre (Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions [1939], §III)
                        A reaction: There seems to be an implied anti-realism in this, since the emotions prevent us from relating more objectively to the world. The 'magic' seems to be compulsory.
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 1. Purpose of a State
States have a monopoly of legitimate violence
                        Full Idea: Max Weber observed that states possess a monopoly of legitimate violence.
                        From: report of Jean-Paul Sartre (Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions [1939]) by Jonathan Wolff - An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) 2 'State'
                        A reaction: This sounds rather hair-raising, and often is, but it sounds quite good if we describe it as a denial of legitimate violence to individual citizens. Hobbes would like it, since individual violence breaches some sort of natural contract. Guns in USA.