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| 4304 | Descartes says there are two substance, Spinoza one, and Leibniz infinitely many |
| Full Idea: Descartes was a dualist about substance, Spinoza was a monist, and Leibniz was a pluralist (an infinity of substances). | |||
| From: John Cottingham (The Rationalists [1988], p.76) | |||
| A reaction: Spinoza is appealing. We posit a substance, as the necessary basis for existence, but it is unclear how more than one substance can be differentiated. If mind is a separate substance, why isn't iron? Why aren't numbers? |
| 4303 | The notion of substance lies at the heart of rationalist metaphysics |
| Full Idea: The notion of substance lies at the heart of rationalist metaphysics. | |||
| From: John Cottingham (The Rationalists [1988], p.75) | |||
| A reaction: The idea of 'substance' has had an interesting revival in modern philosophy (though not, obviously, in physics). Maybe physics and philosophy have views of reality which are not complementary, but are rivals. |
| 4306 | For rationalists, it is necessary that effects be deducible from their causes |
| Full Idea: The rationalist view of causation takes it that to make effects intelligible, it must be shown that they are in principle deducible from their causes. | |||
| From: John Cottingham (The Rationalists [1988], p.92) | |||
| A reaction: This has intuitive appeal, but deduction is only possible with further premises, such as the laws of physics. The effects of human behaviour look a bit tricky, even if we cause them. |