Ideas from 'Intuitionism' by Jonathan Dancy [1991], by Theme Structure

[found in 'A Companion to Ethics' (ed/tr Singer,Peter) [Blackwell 1993,0-631-18785-5]].

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22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
If there are intuited moral facts, why should we care about them?
                        Full Idea: Critics asked (of intuitionism) why, if moral facts are as the intuitionists say, we should care about them at all.
                        From: Jonathan Dancy (Intuitionism [1991])
                        A reaction: It is a good question, as we don't care much about other a priori truths, such as the square root of 169.
Internalists say that moral intuitions are motivating; externalist say a desire is also needed
                        Full Idea: There is an internalist view of intuitionism, saying that to accept that one's action is wrong is itself to be motivated not to do it. Externalists (like Ross) say that moral judgements need the help of an independent desire to motivate us.
                        From: Jonathan Dancy (Intuitionism [1991])
                        A reaction: The internalists would be closer to Kant or Plato (for whom reason or pure ideas motivate), while externalist would favour Hume's belief/desire account of human actions. I like Kant and Plato, but Hume is more plausible. Dancy disagrees (Idea 7262).
Obviously judging an action as wrong gives us a reason not to do it
                        Full Idea: It is ludicrous to say that we might accept an action is outrageously wrong and still think of this as not in itself giving us good reason to hold back.
                        From: Jonathan Dancy (Intuitionism [1991])
                        A reaction: If we think of some dreadful man-made famine in a remote continent, our judgement may well give a reason to act, but apathy usually intervenes. We are discussing a purely theoretical motive on the one hand, and an actual motivator on the other.
Moral facts are not perceived facts, but perceived reasons for judgements
                        Full Idea: I intend to suggest that moral facts are best thought of not as facts perceived but as reasons recognised in the exercise of practical moral judgement.
                        From: Jonathan Dancy (Intuitionism [1991])
                        A reaction: I'm not convinced by this modified version. Why should the fact that someone is in pain be, in itself, a reason to prevent it? There are different cultural traditions for response to the pain of others. We are the squeamish tradition.