Ideas from 'Reference and Essence (1st edn)' by Nathan Salmon [1981], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Reference and Essence (2nd ed)' by Salmon,Nathan [Prometheus 2005,1-59102-215-0]].

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2. Reason / D. Definition / 11. Ostensive Definition
Ostensive definitions needn't involve pointing, but must refer to something specific
                        Full Idea: So-called ostensive definitions need not literally involve ostension, e.g. pointing, but they must involve genuine reference of some sort (in this case reference to a sample of water).
                        From: Nathan Salmon (Reference and Essence (1st edn) [1981], 4.11.2)
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / h. System S5
S4, and therefore S5, are invalid for metaphysical modality
                        Full Idea: Salmon argues that S4 and therefore S5 are invalid for metaphysical modality.
                        From: report of Nathan Salmon (Reference and Essence (1st edn) [1981], 238-40) by Timothy Williamson - Modal Logic within Counterfactual Logic 4
                        A reaction: [He gives references for Salmon, and for his own reply] Salmon's view seems to be opposed my most modern logicians (such as Ian Rumfitt).
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
Essentialism says some properties must be possessed, if a thing is to exist
                        Full Idea: The metaphysical doctrine of essentialism says that certain properties of things are properties that those things could not fail to have, except by not existing.
                        From: Nathan Salmon (Reference and Essence (1st edn) [1981], 3.8.2)
                        A reaction: A bad account of essentialism, and a long way from Aristotle. It arises from the logicians' tendency to fix objects entirely in terms of a 'flat' list of predicates (called 'properties'!), which ignore structure, constitution, history etc.
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
Frege's 'sense' solves four tricky puzzles
                        Full Idea: Reference via sense solves Frege's four puzzles, of the informativeness of identity statements, the failure of substitutivity in attitude contexts, of negative existentials, and the truth-value of statements using nondenoting singular terms.
                        From: Nathan Salmon (Reference and Essence (1st edn) [1981], 1.1.1)
                        A reaction: These must then be compared with Kripke's three puzzles about referring via sense, and the whole debate is then spread before us.
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / a. Direct reference
The perfect case of direct reference is a variable which has been assigned a value
                        Full Idea: The paradigm of a nondescriptional, directly referential, singular term is an individual variable. …The denotation of a variable… is semantically determined directly by the assignment of values.
                        From: Nathan Salmon (Reference and Essence (1st edn) [1981], 1.1.2)
                        A reaction: This cuts both ways. Maybe we are muddling ordinary reference with the simplicities of logical assignments, or maybe we make logical assignments because that is the natural way our linguistic thinking works.
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 5. Reference to Natural Kinds
Nothing in the direct theory of reference blocks anti-essentialism; water structure might have been different
                        Full Idea: There seems to be nothing in the theory of direct reference to block the anti-essentialist assertion that the substance water might have been the very same entity and yet have had a different chemical structure.
                        From: Nathan Salmon (Reference and Essence (1st edn) [1981], 6.23.1)
                        A reaction: Indeed, water could be continuously changing its inner structure, while retaining the surface appearance that gets baptised as 'water'. We make the reasonable empirical assumption, though, that structure-change implies surface-change.