Ideas from 'Causation in a Physical World' by Hartry Field [2003], by Theme Structure

[found in 'The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics' (ed/tr Loux,M /Zimmerman,D) [OUP 2005,0-19-928422-9]].

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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
Explain single events by general rules, or vice versa, or probability explains both, or they are unconnected
                        Full Idea: Some think singular causal claims should be explained in terms of general causal claims; some think the order should be reversed; some think a third thing (e.g. objective probability) will explain both; and some think they are only loosely connected.
                        From: Hartry Field (Causation in a Physical World [2003], 2)
                        A reaction: I think Ducasse gives the best account, which is the second option, of giving singular causal claims priority. Probability (Mellor) strikes me as a non-starter, and the idea that they are fairly independent seems rather implausible.
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 5. Direction of causation
Identifying cause and effect is not just conventional; we explain later events by earlier ones
                        Full Idea: It is not just that the earlier member of a cause-effect pair is conventionally called the cause; it is also connected with other temporal asymmetries that play an important role in our practices. We tend to explain later events in terms of earlier ones.
                        From: Hartry Field (Causation in a Physical World [2003], 1)
                        A reaction: We also interfere with the earlier one to affect the later one, and not vice versa (Idea 8363). I am inclined to think that attempting to explain the direction of causation is either pointless or hopeless.
Physical laws are largely time-symmetric, so they make a poor basis for directional causation
                        Full Idea: It is sometimes pointed out that (perhaps with a few minor exceptions) the fundamental physical laws are completely time-symmetric. If so, then if one is inclined to found causation on fundamental physical law, it isn't evident how directionality gets in.
                        From: Hartry Field (Causation in a Physical World [2003], 1)
                        A reaction: All my instincts tell me that causation is more fundamental than laws, and that directionality is there at the start. That, though, raises the nice question of how, if causation explains laws, the direction eventually gets left OUT!
The only reason for adding the notion of 'cause' to fundamental physics is directionality
                        Full Idea: Although it is true that the notion of 'cause' is not needed in fundamental physics, even statistical physics, still directionality considerations don't preclude this notion from being consistently added to fundamental physics.
                        From: Hartry Field (Causation in a Physical World [2003], 1)
                        A reaction: This only makes sense if the notion of cause already has directionality built into it, which I think is correct. The physicist might reply that they don't care about directionality, but the whole idea of an experiment seems to depend on it (Idea 8363).