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| 15789 | Lewis's distinction of 'existing' from 'being actual' is Meinong's between 'existing' and 'subsisting' |
| Full Idea: I suggest that Lewis's view in fact is just Meinong's view. ...Meinong distinguishes between 'existing' and merely 'subsisting', Lewis between 'being actual' and merely 'existing'. | |||
| From: comment on David Lewis (Possible Worlds [1973]) by William Lycan - The Trouble with Possible Worlds 06 | |||
| A reaction: Lewis attempts to make actuality purely 'indexical' in character, like distinguishing the world 'here' from the world 'elsewhere', but Lycan seems right that he is committed to more than that. |
| 15790 | Lewis can't know possible worlds without first knowing what is possible or impossible |
| Full Idea: Lewis's knowledge of what possible worlds there are and of other general truths about worlds is posterior, not prior, to his knowledge of what things are possible and what things are impossible. | |||
| From: comment on David Lewis (Possible Worlds [1973]) by William Lycan - The Trouble with Possible Worlds 07 | |||
| A reaction: This elementary objection seems to me to destroy any attempt to explain modality in terms of possible worlds. It is a semantics for modal statements, but that doesn't make it an ontology. To assess possibilities, study actuality. |
| 15791 | What are the ontological grounds for grouping possibilia into worlds? |
| Full Idea: Lewis must seek some ontological ground for the grouping of possibilia into disjoint worlds. | |||
| From: comment on David Lewis (Possible Worlds [1973]) by William Lycan - The Trouble with Possible Worlds 07 | |||
| A reaction: I do love people like Lycan who ask the simple commonsense questions about these highly sophisticated systems that students of philosophy are required to study. If a proposition is a 'set of worlds', understanding a proposition is beyond me. |