Ideas from 'How to Russell a Frege-Church' by David Kaplan [1975], by Theme Structure

[found in 'The Possible and the Actual' (ed/tr Loux,Michael J.) [Cornell 1979,0-8014-9178-9]].

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5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / c. Theory of definite descriptions
For Russell, expressions dependent on contingent circumstances must be eliminated
                        Full Idea: It is a tenet of Russell's theory that all expressions, and especially definite descriptions, whose denotation is dependent upon contingent circumstances must be eliminated.
                        From: David Kaplan (How to Russell a Frege-Church [1975], II)
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / d. Haecceitism
'Haecceitism' is common thisness under dissimilarity, or distinct thisnesses under resemblance
                        Full Idea: That a common 'thisness' may underlie extreme dissimilarity or distinct thisnesses may underlie great resemblance I call 'haecceitism'. (I prefer the pronunciation Hex'-ee-i-tis-m).
                        From: David Kaplan (How to Russell a Frege-Church [1975], IV)
                        A reaction: [odd pronunciation, if 'haec' is pronounced haeek] The view seems to be very unpopular (e.g. with Lewis, Bird and Mumford). But there is an intuitive sense of whether or not two things are identical when they seem dissimilar.
'Haecceitism' says that sameness or difference of individuals is independent of appearances
                        Full Idea: The doctrine that we can ask whether this is the same individual in another possible world, and that a common 'thisness' may underlie extreme dissimilarity, or distinct thisnesses may underlie great resemblance, I call 'Haecceitism'.
                        From: David Kaplan (How to Russell a Frege-Church [1975], IV)
                        A reaction: Penelope Mackie emphasises that this doctrine, that each thing is somehow individuated, is not the same as believing in actual haecceities, specific properties which achieve the individuating.
If quantification into modal contexts is legitimate, that seems to imply some form of haecceitism
                        Full Idea: If one regards the usual form of quantification into modal and other intensional contexts - modality de re - as legitimate (without special explanations), then one seems committed to some form of haecceitism.
                        From: David Kaplan (How to Russell a Frege-Church [1975], IV)
                        A reaction: That is, modal reference requires fixed identities, irrespective of possible changes in properties. Why could one not refer to objects just as bundles of properties, with some sort of rules about when it ceased to be that particular bundle (keep 60%?)?