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| 12890 | That standards vary with context doesn't imply different truth-conditions for judgements |
| Full Idea: The fact that different standards are routinely applied in making an evaluative judgement does not imply the correctness of semantic contextualism about the contents of judgements. ..We can't infer different truth conditions from differing standards. | |||
| From: Earl Conee (Contextualism Contested [2005], p.51) | |||
| A reaction: This is the basic objection to contextualism from the 'invariantist' camp, which says there are facts about good judgement and justification, despite contextual shifts. My sympathies are with the contextualists (on this one). |
| 12892 | Maybe there is only one context (the 'really and truly' one) for serious discussions of knowledge |
| Full Idea: Maybe every issue about knowledge (Gettier problem, scientific knowledge, justification, scepticism) has been discussed solely in the single 'really and truly' context. | |||
| From: Earl Conee (Contextualism Contested [2005], p.53) | |||
| A reaction: This seems not to be true, if we contrast Descartes' desire for total certainty with Peirce's fallibilism. It seems to me that modern philosophy has deliberately relaxed the standard, in order to make some sort of knowledge possible. Cf. Idea 12894. |