Ideas from 'Infinitism not solution to regress problem' by Carl Ginet [2005], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Contemporary Debates in Epistemology' (ed/tr Steup,M/Sosa,E) [Blackwell 2005,1-4051-0739-1]].

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13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues
Must all justification be inferential?
                        Full Idea: The infinitist view of justification holds that every justification must be inferential: no other kind of justification is possible.
                        From: Carl Ginet (Infinitism not solution to regress problem [2005], p.141)
                        A reaction: This is the key question in discussing whether justification is foundational. I'm not sure whether 'inference' is the best word when something is evidence for something else. I am inclined to think that only propositions can be reasons.
Inference cannot originate justification, it can only transfer it from premises to conclusion
                        Full Idea: Inference cannot originate justification, it can only transfer it from premises to conclusion. And so it cannot be that, if there actually occurs justification, it is all inferential.
                        From: Carl Ginet (Infinitism not solution to regress problem [2005], p.148)
                        A reaction: The idea that justification must have an 'origin' seems to beg the question. I take Klein's inifinitism to be a version of coherence, where the accumulation of good reasons adds up to justification. It is not purely inferential.