Ideas from 'Why coherence is not enough' by James Van Cleve [2005], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Contemporary Debates in Epistemology' (ed/tr Steup,M/Sosa,E) [Blackwell 2005,1-4051-0739-1]].

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13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / a. Agrippa's trilemma

8840	There are five possible responses to the problem of infinite regress in justification

			Full Idea: Sceptics respond to the regress problem by denying knowledge; Foundationalists accept justifications without reasons; Positists say reasons terminate is mere posits; Coherentists say mutual support is justification; Infinitists accept the regress.
			From: James Van Cleve (Why coherence is not enough [2005], I)
			A reaction: A nice map of the territory. The doubts of Scepticism are not strong enough for anyone to embrace the view; Foundationalist destroy knowledge (?), as do Positists; Infinitism is a version of Coherentism - which is the winner.

13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism

8841	Modern foundationalists say basic beliefs are fallible, and coherence is relevant

			Full Idea: Contemporary foundationalists are seldom of the strong Cartesian variety: they do not insist that basic beliefs be absolutely certain. They also tend to allow that coherence can enhance justification.
			From: James Van Cleve (Why coherence is not enough [2005], III)
			A reaction: It strikes me that they have got onto a slippery slope. How certain are the basic beliefs? How do you evaluate their certainty? Could incoherence in their implications undermine them? Skyscrapers need perfect foundations.