Ideas from 'Perceptual experience has conceptual content' by Bill Brewer [2005], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Contemporary Debates in Epistemology' (ed/tr Steup,M/Sosa,E) [Blackwell 2005,1-4051-0739-1]].

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13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / c. Empirical foundations
Sense experiences must have conceptual content, since they are possible reasons for judgements
                        Full Idea: Given that sense experiential states do provide reasons for empirical beliefs, they must have conceptual content, ...where a mental state with conceptual content is one where the content is of a possible judgement by the subject.
                        From: Bill Brewer (Perceptual experience has conceptual content [2005], I)
                        A reaction: This is, I believe, wrong. Even complex observations, like a pool of blood, only become reasons when they have been interpreted. Otherwise they are just the raw ingredients of evidence. How could an uninterpreted red patch be a 'reason'?