Ideas from 'Scientific Essentialism' by Brian Ellis [2001], by Theme Structure
[found in 'Scientific Essentialism' by Ellis,Brian [CUP 2007,0-521-03774-3]].
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1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 4. Metaphysics as Science
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13567
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Ontology should give insight into or an explanation of the world revealed by science
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4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / h. System S5
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13604
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Real possibility and necessity has the logic of S5, which links equivalence classes of worlds of the same kind
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5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 5. Extensionalism
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13606
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Humean conceptions of reality drive the adoption of extensional logic
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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
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13584
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The extension of a property is a contingent fact, so cannot be the essence of the property
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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 5. Natural Properties
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13587
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There is no property of 'fragility', as things are each fragile in a distinctive way
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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
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13577
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Typical 'categorical' properties are spatio-temporal, such as shape
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9436
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The property of 'being an electron' is not of anything, and only electrons could have it
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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
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13582
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'Being a methane molecule' is not a property - it is just a predicate
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8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 1. Powers
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13580
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Causal powers must necessarily act the way they do
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13598
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Causal powers are often directional (e.g. centripetal, centrifugal, circulatory)
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8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived
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13568
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Basic powers may not be explained by structure, if at the bottom level there is no structure
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13586
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Maybe dispositions can be explained by intrinsic properties or structures
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8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions
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13585
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The most fundamental properties of nature (mass, charge, spin ...) all seem to be dispositions
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8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / b. Dispositions and powers
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13596
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A causal power is a disposition to produce forces
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13599
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Powers are dispositions of the essences of kinds that involve them in causation
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8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
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13572
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There are 'substantive' (objects of some kind), 'dynamic' (events of some kind) and 'property' universals
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13573
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Universals are all types of natural kind
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
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13571
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Scientific essentialism doesn't really need Kripkean individual essences
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
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13578
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The old idea that identity depends on essence and behaviour is rejected by the empiricists
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10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
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13576
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Necessities are distinguished by their grounds, not their different modalities
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10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 6. Necessity from Essence
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13570
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Individual essences necessitate that individual; natural kind essences necessitate kind membership
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14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction
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13607
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If events are unconnected, then induction cannot be solved
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14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / c. Explanations by coherence
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13597
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Good explanations unify
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14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / i. Explanations by mechanism
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13601
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Explanations of particular events are not essentialist, as they don't reveal essential structures
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14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
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13569
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To give essentialist explanations there have to be natural kinds
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15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 6. Idealisation
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13600
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The point of models in theories is not to idealise, but to focus on what is essential
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26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 3. Knowing Kinds
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13583
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There might be uninstantiated natural kinds, such as transuranic elements which have never occurred
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26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 4. Source of Kinds
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13574
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Natural kinds are distinguished by resting on essences
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26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 7. Critique of Kinds
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13575
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If there are borderline cases between natural kinds, that makes them superficial
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26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
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13595
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Laws don't exist in the world; they are true of the world
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26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
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13566
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A proton must have its causal role, because without it it wouldn't be a proton
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13579
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What is most distinctive of scientific essentialism is regarding processes as natural kinds
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13581
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Scientific essentialism is more concerned with explanation than with identity (Locke, not Kripke)
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13594
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The ontological fundamentals are dispositions, and also categorical (spatio-temporal and structural) properties
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26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / b. Scientific necessity
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13603
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A primary aim of science is to show the limits of the possible
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