Ideas from 'Stipulation, Meaning and Apriority' by Paul Horwich [2000], by Theme Structure
[found in 'New Essays on the A Priori' (ed/tr Boghossian,P /Peacocke,C) [OUP 2000,0-19-924127-9]].
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2. Reason / D. Definition / 13. Against Definition
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How do we determine which of the sentences containing a term comprise its definition?
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12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori
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A priori belief is not necessarily a priori justification, or a priori knowledge
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12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 6. A Priori from Reason
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Understanding needs a priori commitment
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12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic
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Meaning is generated by a priori commitment to truth, not the other way around
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12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 9. A Priori from Concepts
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Meanings and concepts cannot give a priori knowledge, because they may be unacceptable
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If we stipulate the meaning of 'number' to make Hume's Principle true, we first need Hume's Principle
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12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 10. A Priori as Subjective
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A priori knowledge (e.g. classical logic) may derive from the innate structure of our minds
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