Ideas from 'Consciousness,Represn, and Knowledge' by Keith Lehrer [2006], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness' (ed/tr Kriegel,U /Williford,K) [MIT 2006,0-262-61211-9]].

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13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
Justification is coherence with a background system; if irrefutable, it is knowledge
                        Full Idea: Justification is coherence with a background system which, when irrefutable, converts to knowledge.
                        From: Keith Lehrer (Consciousness,Represn, and Knowledge [2006])
                        A reaction: A problem (as the theory stands here) would be whether you have to be aware that the coherence is irrefutable, which would seem to require a pretty powerful intellect. If one needn't be aware of the irrefutability, how does it help my justification?
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
Generalization seems to be more fundamental to minds than spotting similarities
                        Full Idea: There is a level of generalization we share with other animals in the responses to objects that suggest that generalization is a more fundamental operation of the mind than the observation of similarities.
                        From: Keith Lehrer (Consciousness,Represn, and Knowledge [2006])
                        A reaction: He derives this from Reid (1785) - Lehrer's hero - who argued against Hume that we couldn't spot similarities if we hadn't already generalized to produce the 'respect' of the similarity. Interesting. I think Reid must be right.
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 1. Introspection
All conscious states can be immediately known when attention is directed to them
                        Full Idea: I am inclined to think that all conscious states can be immediately known when attention is directed to them.
                        From: Keith Lehrer (Consciousness,Represn, and Knowledge [2006])
                        A reaction: This strikes me as a very helpful suggestion, for eliminating lots of problem cases for introspective knowledge which have been triumphally paraded in recent times. It might, though, be tautological, if it is actually a definition of 'conscious states'.