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| 14187 | If logic is topic-neutral that means it delves into all subjects, rather than having a pure subject matter |
| Full Idea: The topic-neutrality of logic need not mean there is a pure subject matter for logic; rather, that the logician may need to go everywhere, into mathematics and even into metaphysics. | |||
| From: Stephen Read (Formal and Material Consequence [1994], 'Logic') |
| 14188 | Not all arguments are valid because of form; validity is just true premises and false conclusion being impossible |
| Full Idea: Belief that every valid argument is valid in virtue of form is a myth. ..Validity is a question of the impossibility of true premises and false conclusion for whatever reason, and some arguments are materially valid and the reason is not purely logical. | |||
| From: Stephen Read (Formal and Material Consequence [1994], 'Logic') | |||
| A reaction: An example of a non-logical reason is the transitive nature of 'taller than'. Conceptual connections are the usual example, as in 'it's red so it is coloured'. This seems to be a defence of the priority of semantic consequence in logic. |
| 14182 | If the logic of 'taller of' rests just on meaning, then logic may be the study of merely formal consequence |
| Full Idea: In 'A is taller than B, and B is taller than C, so A is taller than C' this can been seen as a matter of meaning - it is part of the meaning of 'taller' that it is transitive, but not of logic. Logic is now seen as the study of formal consequence. | |||
| From: Stephen Read (Formal and Material Consequence [1994], 'Reduct') | |||
| A reaction: I think I find this approach quite appealing. Obviously you can reason about taller-than relations, by putting the concepts together like jigsaw pieces, but I tend to think of logic as something which is necessarily implementable on a machine. |
| 14183 | Maybe arguments are only valid when suppressed premises are all stated - but why? |
| Full Idea: Maybe some arguments are really only valid when a suppressed premise is made explicit, as when we say that 'taller than' is a transitive concept. ...But what is added by making the hidden premise explicit? It cannot alter the soundness of the argument. | |||
| From: Stephen Read (Formal and Material Consequence [1994], 'Suppress') |
| 14184 | In modus ponens the 'if-then' premise contributes nothing if the conclusion follows anyway |
| Full Idea: A puzzle about modus ponens is that the major premise is either false or unnecessary: A, If A then B / so B. If the major premise is true, then B follows from A, so the major premise is redundant. So it is false or not needed, and contributes nothing. | |||
| From: Stephen Read (Formal and Material Consequence [1994], 'Repres') | |||
| A reaction: Not sure which is the 'major premise' here, but it seems to be saying that the 'if A then B' is redundant. If I say 'it's raining so the grass is wet', it seems pointless to slip in the middle the remark that rain implies wet grass. Good point. |
| 14186 | Logical connectives contain no information, but just record combination relations between facts |
| Full Idea: The logical connectives are useful for bundling information, that B follows from A, or that one of A or B is true. ..They import no information of their own, but serve to record combinations of other facts. | |||
| From: Stephen Read (Formal and Material Consequence [1994], 'Repres') | |||
| A reaction: Anyone who suggests a link between logic and 'facts' gets my vote, so this sounds a promising idea. However, logical truths have a high degree of generality, which seems somehow above the 'facts'. |
| 14185 | Conditionals are just a shorthand for some proof, leaving out the details |
| Full Idea: Truth enables us to carry various reports around under certain descriptions ('what Iain said') without all the bothersome detail. Similarly, conditionals enable us to transmit a record of proof without its detail. | |||
| From: Stephen Read (Formal and Material Consequence [1994], 'Repres') | |||
| A reaction: This is his proposed Redundancy Theory of conditionals. It grows out of the problem with Modus Ponens mentioned in Idea 14184. To say that there is always an implied 'proof' seems a large claim. |