Ideas from 'Intro to III: Quantifiers' by Dale Jacquette [2002], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Philosophy of Logic: an anthology' (ed/tr Jacquette,Dale) [Blackwell 2002,0-631-21868-8]].

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5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification
Substitutional universal quantification retains truth for substitution of terms of the same type
                        Full Idea: The substitutional interpretation says the universal quantifier is true just in case it remains true for all substitutions of terms of the same type as that of the universally bound variable.
                        From: Dale Jacquette (Intro to III: Quantifiers [2002], p.143)
                        A reaction: This doesn't seem to tell us how it gets started with being true.
Nominalists like substitutional quantification to avoid the metaphysics of objects
                        Full Idea: Some substitutional quantificationists in logic hope to avoid philosophical entanglements about the metaphysics of objects, ..and nominalists can find aid and comfort there.
                        From: Dale Jacquette (Intro to III: Quantifiers [2002], p.143)
                        A reaction: This has an appeal for me, particularly if it avoids abstract objects, but I don't see much problem with material objects, so we might as well have a view that admits those.