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| 10197 | An immanent universal is wholly present in more than one place |
| Full Idea: An immanent universal will routinely be 'at some distance from itself', in the sense that it is wholly present in more than one place. | |||
| From: Dean W. Zimmerman (Distinct Indiscernibles and the Bundle Theory [1997], p.306) | |||
| A reaction: This is the Aristotelian view, which sounds distinctly implausible in this formulation. Though I suppose redness is wholly present in a tomato, in the way that fourness is wholly present in the Horsemen of the Apocalypse. How many rednesses are there? |
| 10198 | If only two indiscernible electrons exist, future differences must still be possible |
| Full Idea: If nothing existed except two electrons, which are indiscernible, it remains possible that differences will emerge later. Even if this universe has eternal symmetry, such differences are still logically, metaphysically, physically and causally possible. | |||
| From: Dean W. Zimmerman (Distinct Indiscernibles and the Bundle Theory [1997], p.306) | |||
| A reaction: The question then is whether the two electrons have hidden properties that make differences possible. Zimmerman assumes that 'laws' of an indeterministic kind will do the job. I doubt that. Can differences be discerned after the event? |
| 10199 | Discernible differences at different times may just be in counterparts |
| Full Idea: Possible differences which may later become discernible could be treated as differences in a counterpart, which is similar to, but not identical with, the original object. | |||
| From: Dean W. Zimmerman (Distinct Indiscernibles and the Bundle Theory [1997], p.307) | |||
| A reaction: [compressed] This is a reply to Idea 10198, which implies that two things could never be indiscernible over time, because of their different possibilities. One must then decide issues about rigid designation and counterparts. |