Ideas from 'Review of Aron 'Our Knowledge of Universals'' by H.H. Price [1946], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Philosophy' (ed/tr -) [- ,]].

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18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / a. Origin of concepts

10645

We reach concepts by clarification, or by definition, or by habitual experience

			Full Idea: We have three different ways in which we arrive at concepts or universals: there is a clarification, where we have a ready-made concept and define it; we have a combination (where a definition creates a concept); and an experience can lead to a habit.
			From: H.H. Price (Review of Aron 'Our Knowledge of Universals' [1946], p.190)
			A reaction: [very compressed] He cites Russell as calling the third one a 'condensed induction'. There seems to an intellectualist and non-intellectualist strand in the abstractionist tradition.

18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 2. Abstracta by Selection

10644

A 'felt familiarity' with universals is more primitive than abstraction

			Full Idea: A 'felt familiarity' with universals seems to be more primitive than explicit abstraction.
			From: H.H. Price (Review of Aron 'Our Knowledge of Universals' [1946], p.188)
			A reaction: This I take to be part of the 'given' of the abstractionist view, which is quite well described in the first instance by Aristotle. Price says that it is 'pre-verbal'.

10646

Our understanding of 'dog' or 'house' arises from a repeated experience of concomitances

			Full Idea: Whether you call it inductive or not, our understanding of such a word as 'dog' or 'house' does arise from a repeated experience of concomitances.
			From: H.H. Price (Review of Aron 'Our Knowledge of Universals' [1946], p.191)
			A reaction: Philosophers don't use phrases like that last one any more. How else could we form the concept of 'dog' - if we are actually allowed to discuss the question of concept-formation, instead of just the logic of concepts.