Ideas from 'Truth-makers' by Mulligan/Simons/Smith [1984], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Truth and Truth-Making' (ed/tr Lowe,E.J./Rami,A.) [Acumen 2009,978-1-84465-145-0]].

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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 2. Truthmaker Relation
Part-whole is the key relation among truth-makers
                        Full Idea: The most important (ontological) relations holding among truth-makers are the part and whole relations.
                        From: Mulligan/Simons/Smith (Truth-makers [1984], §6)
                        A reaction: Hence Peter Simons goes off and writes the best known book on mereology. Looks very promising to me.
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
Moments (objects which cannot exist alone) may serve as truth-makers
                        Full Idea: A 'moment' is an existentially dependent or non-self-sufficient object, that is, an object which is of such a nature that it cannot exist alone, ....... and we suggest that moments could serve as truth-makers.
                        From: Mulligan/Simons/Smith (Truth-makers [1984], §2)
                        A reaction: [These three writers invented the term 'truth-maker']
Despite negative propositions, truthmakers are not logical complexes, but ordinary experiences
                        Full Idea: Because of negative propositions, investigators of truth-makers have said that they are special non-objectual entities with a logical complexity, but we think a theory is possible in which the truth relation is tied to ordinary and scientific experience.
                        From: Mulligan/Simons/Smith (Truth-makers [1984], §6)
The truth-maker for a sentence may not be unique, or may be a combination, or several separate items
                        Full Idea: A proposition may have a minimal truth-maker which is not unique, or a sentence may be made true by no single truth-maker but only by several jointly, or again only by several separately.
                        From: Mulligan/Simons/Smith (Truth-makers [1984], §3)
Truth-makers cannot be the designata of the sentences they make true
                        Full Idea: Truth-makers cannot be the designata of the sentences they make true, because sentences with more than one truth-maker would then be ambiguous, and 'a' and 'a exists' would have the same designatum.
                        From: Mulligan/Simons/Smith (Truth-makers [1984], §3)
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
Correspondence has to invoke facts or states of affairs, just to serve as truth-makers
                        Full Idea: The correspondence theory of truth invokes a special category of non-objectual entities - facts, states of affairs, or whatever - simply to serve as truth-makers.
                        From: Mulligan/Simons/Smith (Truth-makers [1984], §3)