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| 18351 | Propositions are made true, in virtue of something which explains its truth |
| Full Idea: If a proposition is 'made' true, it has to be true 'in virtue of' something, meaning a relationship of metaphysical explanation. Thus a true proposition must have truth conferred on it in some way that explains how it gets to be true. | |||
| From: E.J. Lowe (An essentialist approach to Truth-making [2009], p.202) | |||
| A reaction: It is good to ask what we mean by 'makes'. I like essentialist explanations, but this may be misplaced. Observing that y makes x true seems to be rather less than actually explaining how it does it. What would such explanations look like? |
| 18353 | Modes are beings that are related both to substances and to universals |
| Full Idea: Modes are real beings that stand in non-contingent formal ontological relations both to individual substances and to immanent universals. | |||
| From: E.J. Lowe (An essentialist approach to Truth-making [2009], p.212) | |||
| A reaction: Not sure I understand this, but I pass it on. 'Modes' seem to invite the Razor, if we already have substances and universals. I am no clear about 'instantiation' because I now have the word 'mode' to play with. |
| 18352 | Tropes have existence independently of any entities |
| Full Idea: Pure trope theorists must apparently hold that each trope has its identity underivatively, not that it depends for it on or owes it to other entities of any sort. | |||
| From: E.J. Lowe (An essentialist approach to Truth-making [2009], p.207) | |||
| A reaction: Lowe defends dependent 'modes' of things, against independent 'tropes'. Good, but he then has to say what the thing is (a modeless 'substance'?), because it can't just be a bundle of modes or tropes. |