Ideas from 'Essential vs Accidental Properties' by Adolph Rami [2008], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Stanford Online Encyclopaedia of Philosophy' (ed/tr Stanford University) [ ,-]].

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9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism
The extremes of essentialism are that all properties are essential, or only very trivial ones
                        Full Idea: It would be natural to label one extreme view 'maximal essentialism' - that all of an object's properties are essential - and the other extreme 'minimal' - that only trivial properties such as self-identity of being either F or not-F are essential.
                        From: Adolph Rami (Essential vs Accidental Properties [2008])
                        A reaction: Personally I don't accept the trivial ones as being in any way describable as 'properties'. The maximal view destroys any useful notion of essence. Leibniz is a minority holder of the maximal view. I would defend a middle way.
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
An 'individual essence' is possessed uniquely by a particular object
                        Full Idea: An 'individual essence' is a property that in addition to being essential is also unique to the object, in the sense that it is not possible that something distinct from that object possesses that property.
                        From: Adolph Rami (Essential vs Accidental Properties [2008], 5)
                        A reaction: She cites a 'haecceity' (or mere bare identity) as a trivial example of an individual essence.
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
'Sortal essentialism' says being a particular kind is what is essential
                        Full Idea: According to 'sortal essentialism', an object could not have been of a radically different kind than it in fact is.
                        From: Adolph Rami (Essential vs Accidental Properties [2008], 4)
                        A reaction: This strikes me as thoroughly wrong. Things belong in kinds because of their properties. Could you remove all the contingent features of a tiger, leaving it as merely 'a tiger', despite being totally unrecognisable?
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
Unlosable properties are not the same as essential properties
                        Full Idea: It is easy to confuse the notion of an essential property that a thing could not lack, with a property it could not lose. My having spent Christmas 2007 in Tennessee is a non-essential property I could not lose.
                        From: Adolph Rami (Essential vs Accidental Properties [2008], 1)
                        A reaction: The idea that having spent Christmas in Tennessee is a property I find quite bewildering. Is my not having spent my Christmas in Tennessee one of my properties? I suspect that real unlosable properties are essential ones.
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
Physical possibility is part of metaphysical possibility which is part of logical possibility
                        Full Idea: The usual view is that 'physical possibilities' are a natural subset of the 'metaphysical possibilities', which in turn are a subset of the 'logical possibilities'.
                        From: Adolph Rami (Essential vs Accidental Properties [2008], 1)
                        A reaction: [She cites Fine 2002 for an opposing view] I prefer 'natural' to 'physical', leaving it open where the borders of the natural lie. I take 'metaphysical' possibility to be 'in all naturally possible worlds'. So is a round square a logical possibility?
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 2. Epistemic possibility
If it is possible 'for all I know' then it is 'epistemically possible'
                        Full Idea: There is 'epistemic possibility' when it is 'for all I know'. That is, P is epistemically possible for agent A just in case P is consistent with what A knows.
                        From: Adolph Rami (Essential vs Accidental Properties [2008], 1)
                        A reaction: Two problems: maybe 'we' know, and A knows we know, but A doesn't know. And maybe someone knows, but we are not sure about that, which seems to introduce a modal element into the knowing. If someone knows it's impossible, it's impossible.