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Single Idea 10329

[from 'Knowledge by Agreement' by Martin Kusch, in 13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 7. Testimony ]

Full Idea

How can we hope to reduce testimony to perception if the way we perceive the world is to a considerable extent shaped by concepts and categories that we have learned from others?

Gist of Idea

Testimony won't reduce to perception, if perception depends on social concepts and categories

Source

Martin Kusch (Knowledge by Agreement [2002], Ch. 4)

Book Reference

Kusch,Martin: 'Knowledge by Agreement' [OUP 2004], p.32


A Reaction

To me this sounds like good support for coherentism, the benign circle between my reason, my experience, and the testimony and reason of others. Asking how the circle could get started shows ignorance of biology.