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Single Idea 10344

[from 'Knowledge by Agreement' by Martin Kusch, in 18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts ]

Full Idea

I am unconvinced by McDowell's arguments in favour of treating the world as itself conceptual. Granted that our experience is conceptual in quality; it still does not follow that the world itself is conceptual.

Gist of Idea

Our experience may be conceptual, but surely not the world itself?

Source

Martin Kusch (Knowledge by Agreement [2002], Ch. 9)

Book Reference

Kusch,Martin: 'Knowledge by Agreement' [OUP 2004], p.112


A Reaction

I would take Kusch's point to be a given in any discussion of concepts, and McDowell as a non-starter on this one. I am inclined to believe that we do have non-conceptual experiences, but I take them to be epistemologically useless.