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Single Idea 10368

[from 'The Metaphysics of Causation' by Jonathan Schaffer, in 26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata ]

Full Idea

Theorists who reject both events and facts as causal relata do so because the relata must be immanent in nature, and thus not facts, but also fine-grained and thus not events.

Gist of Idea

If causal relata must be in nature and fine-grained, neither facts nor events will do

Source

Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 1.2)

Book Reference

'Stanford Online Encyclopaedia of Philosophy', ed/tr. Stanford University [plato.stanford.edu], p.7


A Reaction

Kim, however, offers a fine-grained account of events (as triples), and Bennett individuates them even more finely (as propositions), so events might be saved. Descriptions can be very fine-grained.