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Single Idea 10424

[from 'On Sense and Reference' by Gottlob Frege, in 5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive ]

Full Idea

We could think of a referring expression in Fregean terms as what he calls a proper name (Eigenname): its Sinn (sense) is supposed to determine an object as opposed to a concept as its Bedeutung (referent).

Gist of Idea

A Fregean proper name has a sense determining an object, instead of a concept

Source

report of Gottlob Frege (On Sense and Reference [1892]) by Mark Sainsbury - The Essence of Reference 18.1

Book Reference

'Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language', ed/tr. Lepore,E/Smith,B [OUP 2008], p.395


A Reaction

The problem would be that the same expression could precisely indicate an object on one occasion, nearly do so on another, and totally fail on a third.